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INTRODUCTION
"[I] t is inappropriate to take into account whether the imposition of
liability would have a negative effect on corporate earnings, or
would reduce employment in a given industry. These considera-
tions do not speak to whether a product is reasonably designed."'
The United States has been the world leader in aviation since the
Wright brothers pioneered flight over ninety years ago.2 Over the
past decade, however, the U.S. general aviations industry has withered
to a shadow of what it once was. Declining aircraft sales signal an
industry at the point of collapse. In 1978, U.S. general aviation manu-
facturers produced over 18,000 planes.4 By 1991, production had
fallen to less than 900.5 The production of single engine piston air-
craft has fallen even more sharply, from 14,000 units in 1978 to 555 in
1993.6 Piper Aircraft Corporation, for example, produced 5,200 air-
craft in 1978. In 1991, it filed for bankruptcy and shipped only eighty-
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Toms: PRODUCTS LIABnxry § 2 cmt. d (1994) (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1994) [hereinafter TENTATIVE DRAFT 1].
2 GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, LIABILITY REFORM FOR GENERAL
AVIATION: A NEED AT THE POINT OF CIusis 3 (1992) [hereinafter GAMA].
3 The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 defines general aviation aircraft as:
[A]ny aircraft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness certificate has
been issued by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
which, at the time such certificate was originally issued, had a maximum
seating capacity of fewer than 20 passengers, and which was not, at the time
of the accident, engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations ....
Pub. L No. 103-298, § 2(c), 108 Stat. 1552, 1553. See also Robert Martin, General Aviation
Manufacturing: An Industry under Siege, in THE LIABILI Y MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY
LAw ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 478, 478 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991)
[hereinafter THE LIAnIrv MAZE] (defining general aviation as "every form of civil aviation
except that directly related to scheduled domestic and international airline operations"
and noting that general aviation aircraft are typically "designed to carry fewer than twenty
persons and may be fixed-wing or rotary-wing airplanes, powered by piston-driven or tur-
bine engines").
4 GAMA, supra note 2, at 1.
5 Id.




five aircraft. 7 Cessna Aircraft Company, which once dominated the
world market and boasted of "teaching the world to fly,"" stopped pro-
ducing single engine piston aircraft in 1986.9 The dominant position
once held by American general aviation aircraft manufacturers in in-
ternational trade has also slipped dramatically. 10 Consistent with this
decline in production, seventy percent of the industry's workers have
lost their jobs over the past fourteen years.1 '
General aviation is one of the most intensely regulated industries
in the United States.' 2 Since its enactment of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958,13 Congress has regulated nearly every aspect of the manufac-
ture and operation of general aviation aircraft for the purpose of en-
suring "the highest degree of safety."' 4 However, while safety is the
primary objective of the federal regulatory scheme, current liability
law regards federal safety regulations as only "minimum" standards;
thus, compliance with these regulations does not shield manufactur-
ers from liability in products liability lawsuits.' 5 When a general avia-
tion accident occurs, state, rather than federal, liability standards
apply. This situation has left manufacturers trapped between the con-
flicting authority of the federal government and each of the fifty
states.
Tort reform legislation, which the industry hopes will solve the
general aviation crisis, also ignores the extensive framework of federal
law that regulates the general aviation industry. Because it fails to util-
ize the existing federal regulatory scheme, such legislation promises
to bury existing regulations under additional, unnecessary federal law.
7 GAMA, supra note 2, at 3; see also S. REP. No. 202,103d Cong., lst Sess. n.7, available
in 1993 WL 484770.
8 Gregory P. Wells, Comment, General Aviation Accident Liability Standards: Why The
Fuss?, 56J. AIR L. & COM. 895, 896 n.6 (1991).
9 GAMA, supra note 2, at 3; see also 140 CONG. REc. H5001 (daily ed. June 27, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Glickman) ("Ten years ago, Cessna had more than 1,000 dealers world-
wide selling their [general aviation] aircraft. Today, they have none.").
10 The United States exported $120 million worth of single engine piston aircraft in
1980. H.R. REP. No. 525(I), supra note 6, at 2, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. at 1639. At
that time, there were very few imports of such aircraft into the United States. Id. Over the
next 12 years, exports declined by $90 million while imports increased to $25 million. Id.
11 139 CONG. REc. S470 (daily ed.Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum intro-
ducing the General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act of 1993) [hereinafter Kas-
sebaum]. Since 1978, 20,000 general aviation employees have lost their jobs, and another
80,000 jobs have been lost in related industries. H.R. REP. No. 525(I), supra note 6, at 2,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. at 1639.
12 Andrew Craig, Product Liability and Safety in GeneralAviation, in THE LIABILIT MAZE,
supra note 3, at 456, 461 (citingJohn S. Yodice, general counsel for the Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association, or AOPA).
13 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-
1557 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
14 Pub. L. No. 85-726, tit. I, § 102(b), 72 Stat. 731, 740 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. app. § 1302(a) (1988)).
15 Id.; Martin, supra note 3, at 489.
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Furthermore, such legislation is heavily biased in favor of general avia-
tion manufacturers. For these reasons, current congressional tort re-
form measures represent an inefficient solution to the general
aviation crisis.
This Note explores possible legal solutions to America's general
aviation crisis. Part I first outlines the federal regulatory framework
that Congress designed to ensure safety in the general aviation indus-
try. This Part then examines the civil liability system and discusses
how modem products liability law affects lawsuits involving general
aviation aircraft accidents. Next, Part I profiles recent federal tort re-
form legislation that general aviation manufacturers hope will save
their industry. Finally, Part I examines the federal preemption doc-
trine and discusses its current and potential effect on litigants in gen-
eral aviation lawsuits.
Part II first criticizes the recent tort reform legislation as a means
of solving the general aviation crisis. This Part argues that such legis-
lation is not only detrimental to legitimate products liability claimants,
but it simultaneously fails to provide the general aviation industry with
sufficient relief from illegitimate products liability lawsuits. Part II
next argues that an efficient solution to the general aviation crisis
would focus on the one objective shared by manufacturers and plain-
tiffs alike-the prevention of accidents. Finally, Part II proposes a
two-step regulatory reform that would first, create an express preemp-
tion clause to govern the area of general air safety, and second, revital-
ize the existing federal air safety regulations. As an efficient solution
to the general aviation crisis, such a reform would still allow plaintiffs
to bring legitimate products liability lawsuits against general aviation
manufacturers. However, a manufacturer's compliance with federal




A. Federal Safety Regulation in the General Aviation Industry
1. A Brief History
The use of general aviation aircraft-as well as their mainte-
nance, repair, and qualification for airworthiness status-is subject to
unusually extensive federal regulation. As a recent report of the
House of Representatives emphasized, one of the most distinguishing
characteristics of the general aviation industry is "the 'cradle to grave'
Federal regulatory oversight of the industry."16 This extensive regula-




tion began in 1938 when the Civil Aeronautics Authority, an agency
within the Department of Commerce, became the first federal agency
charged with regulating aviation safety.' 7 Its responsibilities included
promulgating safety rules, inspecting and certifying aircraft, certifying
pilots, regulating owners, operating air traffic functions, and investi-
gating domestic aviation accidents.' 8
In 1958, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act,19 the Federal Avia-
tion Agency took over the regulatory functions of the Civil Aeronau-
tics Authority.20 In 1966, Congress reorganized the administrative
hierarchy established by the Federal Aviation Act.2' This reorganiza-
tion transferred the duties of the Federal Aviation Agency to the newly
created Department of Transportation (DOT).22 The reorganization
also transferred authority to investigate general aviation accidents to
the DOT.23 The DOT has since delegated responsibility for such in-
vestigations to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),24 an
independent federal agency.2
In 1984, Congress abolished the Civil Aeronautics Authority,
which by that time had been renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board.2 6
Today, the Federal Aviation Agency, renamed the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), is the only federal agency responsible for regu-
lating general aviation. 27 Responsible for promulgating air safety
rules, controlling air traffic, and certifying pilots and aircraft, the FAA
shapes the legal responsibilities of pilots and general aviation aircraft
manufacturers alike.28 Thus, the agency's interpretation of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act and the regulations and rules promulgated thereun-
17 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). For a discussion of the history of
federal regulation of the aviation industry, see LEE S. KREINDLER, 1 AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW
§ 10.01[1] (1994).
18 Pub. L. No. 706, § 601(a), 52 Stat. 973, 1007 (1938).
19 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-
1557 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
20 Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 601(a), 72 Stat. 731, 775 (1958). By this time, the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority had been renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board by Reorganization Plan
No. IV of 1940. See Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 201 (a) (1), 72 Stat. 731, 741 (1958).
21 The Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931.
22 § 3(e)(1), 80 Stat. at 932.
23 § 5, 80 Stat. at 935.
24 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1441-1443 (1988).
25 The Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-633, tit. 11, 88 Stat. 2166
(codified at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-1907 (1988)). Prior to 1975, the NTSB was an agency
within the Department of Transportation. See Department of Transportation Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 5, 80 Stat. 931, 935-37.
26 The Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 (1984)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1551-1556 (1988)).
27 § 3(e)(1), 80 Stat. at 932.
28 KREINDLER, supra note 17, § 10.1 [1].
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der will continue to have a marked effect on questions of law
emanating from general aviation accidents.29
2. The Scope of the Federal Aviation Act
Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the Act) to
address two broad areas of concern: the rates and routes of commer-
cial air carriers and general air safety.30 Because general aviation in-
cludes, by definition, only aircraft that are not "engaged in scheduled
passenger-carrying operations,"31 the industry is primarily affected by
the provisions of the Act governing general air safety.3 2 In 1978, Con-
gress added section 1305(a) to the Act,3 3 which contains an express
preemption provision governing the rates and routes of commercial
air carriers.3 4 Intended to "prevent conflicts and inconsisten[cies]" aS
between state and federal standards, the amendment bestowed pre-
emptive effect on federal "rates and routes" laws that had, up to that
point, often been simply ignored by state law.3 6 At least according to
the Tenth Circuit, however, Congress did not intend this broad pre-
emptive effect to reach the area of general air safety.3 7
In amending the Act to include a preemption clause governing
rates and routes, Congress also considered general safety concerns as-
sociated with air travel.38 Congress did not, however, enact an express
preemption provision governing general air safety.39 Rather than fur-
ther amend the Act, Congress took a less paternalistic attitude toward
safety.concerns and merely directed the DOT to maintain the status
29 Id.
30 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302 (1988); see also Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d
1438, 1444 (10th Cir.) (discussing rationale behind provisions of the Federal Aviation Act),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
31 The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(c), 108
Stat. 1552, 1553.
32 See 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1421-1432 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
33 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, §4(a), 92 Stat. 1705,
1707-08 (current version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1988)).
34 Titled "Preemption," § 1305(a) reads: "[N]o State... shall enact or enforce any
law ... relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority under sub-
chapter IV of this chapter to provide air transportation." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1)
(1988).
35 H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN.
3737, 3752; see also Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1444 n.17 (10th Cir.)
(discussing preemption clause), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
36 The Supreme Court broadly applied the new clause in Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992), holding that the clause's preemptive effect reaches even
state regulation of airline advertising. Id. at 2040-41.
37 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1444 & nn.13 & 17.
38 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 designated "[t]he assignment and mainte-
nance of safety as the highest priority in air commerce." § 3(a), 92 Stat. at 1706 (codified
as 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(1) (1988)).
39 See Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1444 & n.17.
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quo.40 In contrast to the preemptive effect given to the Federal Avia-
tion Act's standards concerning the rates and routes of commercial air
carriers, "Congress did not intend to preempt lawsuits over design
defects."41
This congressional intent not to exclude state statutory and com-
mon law from the field of aircraft safety is further illustrated by the
existence within the Federal Aviation Act of a savings clause.42 Titled
"Remedies not exclusive," section 1506 of the Act reads as follows:
"Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provi-
sions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies."43 As a result of
this clause, not only may juries apply their own safety standards in
lawsuits involving general aviation accidents, but all state remedies-
such as tort liability for design defects-are also available to
plaintiffs.44
3. The Role of FAA Safety Regulations Today
In addition to their lack of preemptive effect on state law, the
safety standards promulgated under the Federal Aviation Act gov-
erning the design of general aviation aircraft are only "minimum"
standards.45 Section 1421 (a) of the Act reads in part as follows:
The Secretary of Transportation is empowered and it shall be his
duty to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by
prescribing and revising from time to time: (1) Such minimum
40 Section 3(a) of the Airline Deregulation Act directs the Civil Aeronautics Board to
prevent "any deterioration in established safety procedures." 92 Stat. at 1706 (codified at
49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a) (2) (1988)). Section 5(a) declares Congress' intent that the Act
"result in no diminution" of air safety standards and directs the Secretary of Transportation
to prepare annual reports on the extent to which implementation of the Act affects safety.
92 Stat. at 1709 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1307(a)-(b) (1988)); see also Cleveland, 985
F.2d at 1444 n.17 (discussing Congress' safety concerns and noting that "none of these
requirements are inconsistent with state common law duties").
41 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1444 n.17.
42 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
43 Id.
44 While the Cleveland court held that the Federal Aviation Act did not preempt a
products liability claim for defective design, several other courts have held that the Act
does not preempt state tort claims based on other theories. The Ninth Circuit, for exam-
ple, found that the Act did not preempt a state law claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F. 2d 1408, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984).
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Act did not preempt state bailment law as it
relates to the liability of an airplane owner for the negligent acts of a pilot, and it allowed a
wrongful death action to proceed. Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389,
1394 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); see alsoBieneman v. City of Chicago,
864 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that state courts award damages every day in
air crash cases), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989); McEntire v. Estate of Forte, 463 S.W.2d
491, 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (finding that nothing in the FAA's regulatory scheme indi-
cates an intent to preempt the traditional function of state law with respect to tort liability).
45 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a)(1) (1988).
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standards governing the design, materials, workmanship, construc-
tion, and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers as
may be required in the interest of safety .... 46
By designating these standards-known as Federal Aviation Regula-
tions (FARs)-as minimum requirements, "Congress indicated that it
did not want to bar states from adopting additional or more stringent
standards."47 As a result,juries with neither scientific nor engineering
backgrounds are second-guessing FAA experts and finding long-stand-
ing aircraft designs to be "unsafe" and defective.
In addition to the fact that FARs are only minimum standards,
insuring compliance with the safety regulations is the primary respon-
sibility of aircraft manufacturers, not the FAA.48 In fact, the entire
certification process depends on the duty of manufacturers and oper-
ators to ensure that airplanes conform to FAA safety regulations. The
FAA retains merely the responsibility for policing such compliance. 49
Section 1421 (a) (3) of the Federal Aviation Act allows the Secretary of
Transportation to accept certification reports from "properly quali-
fied private persons" instead of FAA officials.50 These private examin-
ers are often aircraft company employees appointed by the FAA to
examine, inspect, and test aircraft for certification purposes.51 After a
general aviation aircraft manufacturer establishes that its design com-
ports with the applicable regulations, the FAA may conduct a "spot
check" of the manufacturer's work.5 2 Thus, as a rule, FAA certifica-
tion is only a minimum check on safety.53
46 Id. § 1421(a).
47 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1445. The Federal Aviation Regulations are a voluminous
body of rules and regulations that set standards for nearly every facet of civil aeronautics.
Codified in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the FARs are quite detailed-
many contain algebraic formulas, complex navigational charts, and technical drawings.
Parts 25 through 35 of the FARs, for example, establish the basic criteria for aircraft airwor-
thiness. Section 25.775(b), titled "Windshields and windows," provides an example of the
unique union of simplicity and complexity that can be found in the FARs:
Windshield panes directly in front of the pilots in the normal conduct of
their duties, and the supporting structures for these panes, must withstand,
without penetration, the impact of a four-pound bird when the velocity of
the airplane (relative to the bird along the airplane's flight path) is equal to
the value of Vc, at sea level, selected under § 25.335 (a).
14 C.F.R. § 25.775(b) (1994). While the section's reference to a four-pound bird seems
archaic, such an impression vanishes as a reader attempts to determine the value of Vc
under § 25.335(a), and is greeted by a geometric graph where Vc is a vector representing
design cruising speed and is defined by comparison to at least seven other selected design
airspeed vectors.
48 See, e.g., United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 815 (1984).
49 Id. at 816.
50 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a)(3) (1988).
51 VarigAirlines, 467 U.S. at 807.
52 Id. at 817.
53 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1446 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 291 (1993).
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The limited role of federal safety regulations in the field of gen-
eral aviation became painfully obvious to Piper Aircraft Corporation
in a recent case of great significance to manufacturers that sell gen-
eral aviation aircraft in the United States. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft
C0n7p. 54 involved a claim of defective design.55 Cleveland, who had
been injured while attempting to take off in his Piper Super Cub air-
plane, convinced a jury that Piper had acted negligently in designing
the aircraft without adequate forward vision from the rear seat and in
failing to provide a rear shoulder harness.56 Despite the fact that the
airplane's tailwheel design was approved by the FAA, and even though
Piper had fully complied with the FAA's seatbelt requirements, 57 the
jury returned a $2.5 million verdict against Piper.58 While general avi-
ation manufacturers such as Piper might have at one time felt safe
knowing that their aircraft met FAA safety requirements, cases such as
Cleveland have stripped them of this peace of mind.
The limited role of federal safety regulations in the field of gen-
eral aviation is also evidenced by the lack of significance juries attach
to the findings of federal aircraft accident investigators. Congress es-
tablished the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as an in-
dependent federal agency on April 1, 1975. 59 The NTSB is required
to determine the probable cause or causes of transportation accidents,
including those involving general aviation aircraft. 60 NTSB field inves-
tigators, engineers, and scientists must also "[a]scertain what will best
tend to reduce or eliminate the possibility of, or recurrence of, acci-
dents by conducting special studies and investigations on matters per-
taining to safety in air navigation and the prevention of accidents."61
Notwithstanding this congressional mandate, NTSB determinations
are often ignored during the litigation process. 62
54 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
55 Id. at 1440.
56 Id. at 1441. On the day of the accident, Cleveland planned to film a glider that was
attached by rope to the aircraft's tail. Id. Prior to takeoff, Cleveland removed the front
pilot's seat of the plane and installed a camera in its place. Id. Piloting the airplane from
the rear pilot seat, Cleveland collided with a van that the airport's owner had parked in the
runway to prevent Cleveland from taking off. Id. Upon impact, Cleveland's head struck
the camera, resulting in serious head and brain injuries. Id.
57 Id. at 1445.
58 Id. at 1440. The trial judge later reduced the verdict against Piper to $1,042,500
plus postjudgment interest and costs. Id. at 1440 n.2.
59 The Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-633, tit. 111, 88 Stat. 2166
(codified at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-1907 (1988)).
60 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(a)(2) (1988).
61 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(a)(5) (1988).
62 Martin, supra note 3, at 490; cf Arthur A. Wolk, Product Liability: A Plaintiffs'Laayer
Responds, AOPA PILOT, June 1993, at 117, 119 (criticizing the "paucity of investigation by




In Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors,63 for example, the plain-
tiffs alleged that a defect in the design of an aircraft engine caused a
crash which killed a family of four.64 The NTSB investigation did not
reveal any product defect that could have caused the accident, and
NTSB investigators concluded that the crash was the result of pilot
error.65 Despite these findings, the jury returned a verdict against the
engine's manufacturer, and awarded the plaintiffs $107,285,0006-
the largest products liability judgment in general aviation history.67
Because the Federal Aviation Act has no express preemption
clause governing general air safety, includes a savings clause, and
designates its safety standards as only minimum standards, the Federal
Aviation Act does not preempt products liability lawsuits based on de-
fective design.68 Despite the enormous costs general aviation aircraft
manufacturers incur in conforming their designs to meet federal
safety standards, 69 no mechanism is currently in place to prevent a
jury from holding manufacturers to higher safety standards. Even
where the FAA certifies a plane's design and the NTSB concludes that
a crash was due to pilot error, a jury may nevertheless charge a manu-
facturer with millions of dollars of damages because its aircraft was
"defectively" designed.
B. Products Liability in the General Aviation Industry
1. A Brief History
In a landmark 1962 case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,70 the
Supreme Court of California affirmed a lower court's judgment that
the manufacturer of a combination power tool was strictly liable in
tort for injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of a defect in the
63 826 F. Supp. 677 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
64 Id. at 681.
65 GAMA, supra note 2, at 8. The lawyer for the decedents declares the NTSB investi-
gation "a sham," and views the Board's conclusions as "irrelevant given the fact that it
virtually performed no investigation." Wolk, supra note 62, at 117.
66 Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 681. Nearly all of the damages awarded were compensa-
tion for the pain and suffering of the decedents. Id. On the defendant's motion for relief,
the court found the jury's verdict to be excessive in several respects and ordered a new trial
on the damages issue unless the plaintiffs agreed to a remittur limiting total damages to
$1,105,000. Id. at 698.
67 John S. Yodice, Preface to Wolk, supra note 62, at 117.
68 The same can be said for lawsuits based on inadequate instructions or warnings.
However, because the safety regulations promulgated under the Federal Aviation Act estab-
lish federal design standards, the amendment this Note proposes would preempt only
claims based on defective design. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the differences between these types of defects and an explanation for why manufac-
turing defect claims are not affected by federal preemption, see infra part I.B.2.
69 Martin, supra note 3, at 490.
70 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
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design and manufacture of the tool.71 According to the court, the
purpose of strict liability is to require the manufacturer of a defective
product, rather than the injured consumer, to bear the cost of injuries
caused by such a product.72 To establish liability on the part of a man-
ufacturer, a plaintiff need only prove "that he [or she] was injured
while using [the product] in a way it was intended to be used as a
result of a defect in design and manufacture of which [the] plaintiff
was not aware." 73 Under this standard of liability, whether or not the
manufacturer engaged in any culpable conduct is immaterial. 74 Since
the Greenman decision, an "overwhelming majority" of American juris-
dictions have incorporated strict liability into their tort law.75
In 1965, the American Law Institute included a general strict
products liability provision in its Restatement (Second) of Torts that
has since come to dominate the law of products liability.76 Titled
"Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer," section 402A reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the busi-
ness of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condi-
tion in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.77
Strict liability under section 402A applies to any manufacturer of a
product.7 Comment (d) of the Restatement specifically cites air-
planes as one of the products to which the rule applies. 79 Whether
officially adopted into state law or used as a drafting guide for similar
provisions, section 402A has been explicitly referenced in thousands
of products liability decisions over the past twenty-five years.80 Some
71 Id. at 901.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 SeeJAMEs A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERsIu, PRODUCTS LIABILrITy PROBLEMS
AND PROCESSES 109 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that, in strict liability, a plaintiff need not "show
fault on the part of the defendant").
75 Id. at 115.
76 Id. at 117.
77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter REsrATEMENT 2D].
78 Id. cmt. f.
79 Id. cmL d.
80 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORmELL L. REv. 1512, 1512 (1992).
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commentators have even claimed that the section has achieved "the
dignity of a holy writ."8 1
Courts have applied section 402A in numerous products liability
cases involving general aviation accidents. In Rudisaile v. Hawk Avia-
tion, Inc.,82 for example, the Suprem& Court of New Mexico held that
an airplane, which was leased without oil in the engine, was "defec-
tive" within the meaning of section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.83 As a result, the court found the owner of the rented plane
strictly liable for the death of the pilot.8 4 In First National Bank v. Tex
Sun Beechcraft, Inc., 5 a Texas appeals court affirmed a trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer of an air-
craft that crashed allegedly as a result of a fatigue fracture that caused
the aircraft's propeller to fail.8 6 The plaintiffs contended that the
fracture was caused by water soluble decals attached to each blade of
the propeller, and that as a result, the aircraft was defective within the
meaning of section 402A.8 7 These cases are indicative of the wide
range of factual scenarios encountered in general aviation cases in
which courts have applied section 402A.
2. The New Restatement of Products Liability Law
On April 12, 1994, the American Law Institute accepted a tenta-
tive draft of the first eight sections of what is essentially a revision of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Drafted by
Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, the Restate-
ment of the Law-Torts: Products Liability (Tentative Draft 1) may
eventually become an independent volume of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts.88 The revision seeks to clarify much of the confu-
sion that has arisen since section 402A was introduced in 1965.89 Ac-
cording to the authors of the new draft, doctrinal developments in
products liability law have rendered the original text and comments of
section 402A "anachronistic and at odds with [the section's] currently
81 Id.
82 592 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1979).
83 Id. at 177.
84 Id. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the absence of oil in the
engine was caused by one of the owner's employees, who, after draining the plane's oil and
replacing its oil filter, forgot to replenish the oil; the decedent also failed to make the
customary pre-flight check of the aircraft prior to takeoff. Id. at 176.
85 No. 05-91-00956-CV, 1992 WL 86624 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1992).
86 Id. at *2. The court of appeals held that collateral estoppel prevented the plaintiffs
from relitigating issues that had been decided against them in a previous lawsuit in Penn-
sylvania federal court. Id. at *3.
87 Id. at *2.
88 As opposed to an independent volume, § 402A is merely a general section within
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
89 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 80, at 1513.
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discerned objectives." 90 In short, the new draft is intended to restate
the Restatement.9 1
Section I of Tentative Draft I outlines a commercial seller's liabil-
ity for harm caused by defective products it has sold. The section
reads:
(a) One engaged in the business of selling products who sells a de-
fective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
caused by the product defect.
(b) A product is defective if, at the time of sale, it contains a manu-
facturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings.92
Section 402A was originally created to address liability for "manufac-
turing defects."93 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however,
products liability actions alleging "design defects" and "defects due to
inadequate instructions or warnings" began to appear rather fre-
quently in American courts. 94 After attempting to apply section 402A
to these new claims, many courts soon discovered that the theories
supporting the imposition of strict liability in manufacturing defect
cases did not carry over to cases involving design defects or defects
due to inadequate instructions or warnings.95
Tentative Draft I recognizes that the liability standards developed
for manufacturing defects are inappropriate for the resolution of
other products liability claims. Therefore, Tentative Draft 1 not only
defines each type of product defect,96 but also establishes separate
standards of liability against which each category of claims will be mea-
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 TENTATIVE DRaFr 1, supra note 1, § 1.
93 Id. cmL a.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Section 2 reads as follows:
For purposes of determining liability under § 1:
(a) A product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in
the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced by the adoption of a rea-
sonable alternative design by the seller or a predecessor in the commer-
cial chain of distribution and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c) A product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the
seller or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution and the





sured.97 Manufacturing defects present the most straightforward
products liability problems. A manufacturing defect is simply "a de-
parture from a product unit's design specifications." 98 An example is
a product that has been constructed improperly.99 Liability for a man-
ufacturing defect will attach to the seller of a product if an injured
party can establish that the product was defective when it left the
hands of the seller and that the defect was a proximate cause of his or
her injuries.'00
Liability for design defects and for defects due to inadequate in-
structions or warnings is based on a concept of responsibility different
from that upon which liability for manufacturing defects is based. 01
Unlike manufacturing defects, design defects and defects due to inad-
equate instructions or warnings cannot be determined by simply mea-
suring a product against its manufacturer's production standards.102
Where manufacturing defects involve clear deviations from a manu-
facturer's normal production standards, a plaintiff bringing an action
based on either a design defect or a defect due to inadequate instruc-
tions or warnings must attack the manufacturer's design or marketing
standards as being unreasonable in and of themselves.'03 In other
words, a product alleged to have a defective design meets the manu-
facturer's specifications but raises the question of whether those speci-
fications create unreasonable risks to the consumer.10 4 A product
allegedly defective due to inadequate instructions or warnings raises
the question of whether the product's seller provided reasonable in-
structions or warnings addressing the risks of injury associated with
the use of its product 0 5
Because a manufacturing defect involves a product's failure to
conform to its intended design, "there is a 'built-in' design standard
against which to measure the particular product unit."10 6 No such
standard of measure exists for design defects. Courts are thus forced
to construct an objective standard of reasonableness with which to
judge a product's design. 0 7 Because society does not benefit from
products that are either too safe or too dangerous, courts must find a
way to balance the level of built-in design safety their reasonableness
97 See id. § 2 and accompanying comments.
98 Id. cmt. b.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. CmLt. a.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. cmL c.
105 Id. cmL. f




standard will require against the costs of implementing such safety.'08
This is the rationale behind Tentative Draft l's adoption of a risk-
utility balancing test, in subsection 2(b), by which courts can deter-
mine whether an alternative design is reasonable and whether its
omission renders the product not reasonably safe.' 09 The test is simi-
lar to the reasonableness test traditionally used in determining
whether an actor has been negligent." 0
The provisions of Tentative Draft 1 do not represent a radical
departure from existing tort law."' The new draft does, however, dis-
pose of much of the strict liability "doctrine" that has come to clutter
the functional underpinnings of defective design products liability
law. While necessarily changing some of the relevant language to con-
form to current understandings of products liability, the authors
stayed "as close as possible to shared perceptions of the evolved mean-
ings of the original section and its comments."" 2 The new draft's
clarification of the three distinct types of product defects, however,
108 As is the case with general aviation aircraft where speed and weight are crucial,
many risks of use can be alleviated only by an unacceptable sacrifice of performance.
Therefore, users of such products must bear an appropriate amount of responsibility for
proper product use. According to Tentative Draft 1, user responsibility for proper product
use would prevent "careless users from being subsidized by more careful users and consum-
ers when the former are paid damages out of funds to which the latter are forced to con-
tribute through higher product prices." TENTATIVE DRAFr 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a.
109 Id. cmt. d. Many factors must be considered in determining whether an alternative
design is reasonable and whether its omission renders a product not reasonably safe. In-
cluded are:
[T]he magnitude of foreseeable risks of harm, the nature and strength of
consumer expectations, the effects of the alternative design on costs of pro-
duction, the effects of the alternative design on product function, the rela-
tive advantages and disadvantages of proposed safety features, product
longevity, maintenance and repair, esthetics, and marketability.
Id. Furthermore, the new draft emphasizes that consumer expectations, heretofore used
by many courts as a test of whether a defect renders a product unreasonably dangerous, are
merely one factor, among many, in risk-utility balancing under subsection 2(b). See id.
cmt. e.
For an example of a court applying the consumer expectations test to determine
whether a helicopter defect that prevented the pilot from using autorotation in case of
engine failure was an unreasonably dangerous defective condition, see Berkebile v. Brandy
Helicopter Corp., 281 A.2d 707, 709 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971). For an example of a court
applying the risk-utility test to determine whether the icing of an aircraft's carburetor upon
entering a cloud rendered the aircraft dangerously defective, see Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Or. 1978). See also Scott V. Lindvall, Aircraft Crashworthiness:
Should the Courts Set the Standards, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371, 386-87 (1986) (discussing
the two tests courts have developed to determine whether a design was defective); Wells,
supra note 8, at 905-08 (discussing strict liability and the differing approaches courts have
used to determine whether a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" exists under
§ 402A).
110 See RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 77, §§ 291-293. Subsection 2(c) of Tentative Draft
1 also adopts a reasonableness test for judging the adequacy of product instructions and
warnings. See TENTATIVE DRAFT 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. f.
111 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 80, at 1513.
112 Id.
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serves as a touchstone for this Note's discussion of federal
preemption.
As discussed above, compliance with the safety standards promul-
gated under the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt products lia-
bility lawsuits based on defective design. When attacking a product's
design, a plaintiff must make reference-often through a reasonable-
ness (risk-utility balancing) test-to a standard outside the product
manufacturer's own design specifications.' 1 3 The issue of federal pre-
emption arises when the manufacturer points to its compliance with
federal aviation safety standards as proof of the reasonableness of its
design. However, because the Federal Aviation Act contains no ex-
press preemption clause governing general air safety, includes a sav-
ings clause, and designates its safety standards as only minimum
standards, general aviation aircraft manufacturers can be held to
more stringent design standards than those mandated by federal
safety regulations.
In contrast to its impact on claims alleging defective design, the
lack of preemptive effect given to federal air safety standards has no
relevance to claims alleging manufacturing defects.'14 As discussed
above, a manufacturing defect is "a departure from a product unit's
design specifications." 15 In order for liability to attach to a seller, a
plaintiff need only establish that the product was defective when it left
the hands of that specific seller." 6 Whether or not a manufacturer
complied with federal safety regulations has nothing to do with this
concept of responsibility." 7 Even if federal safety standards were
113 TENTATiVE DRAftr 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. c.
114 The amendment proposed in this Note, see infra part II.B.1, would not affect claims
based on inadequate instructions or warnings either. Since the primary purpose of the
FARs is to regulate design safety, not instructions or warnings, compliance with such stan-
dards could not preempt a claim based on inadequate instructions or warnings. See infra
note 232 and accompanying text (discussing the preemptive effect given to federal warning
regulations under the Cigarette Act); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Claims based on manufacturing defects, on the other hand, would not be preempted
under this Note's proposal for a different reason-such claims are based on an alternative
theory of liability. In other words, a defendant manufacturer could not point to its compli-
ance with federal design regulations as a basis of preemption when being sued for a manu-
facturing defect because it is the manufacturer's own standards of production the plaintiff
would be attacking (i.e., a seat belt was improperly installed when it left the factory), rather
than the reasonableness of the manufacturer's design. See, e.g., TENTATrE DRAmr 1, supra
note 1, § 2 cmt. c.
115 TENTATW DRar" 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. b.
116 Id.
117 One could imagine a scenario where despite a manufacturing defect that caused
injury to an occupant in an aircraft, a particular design is still found to be in accordance
with federal design standards. For example, suppose the FARs require landing gear on
small general aviation aircraft to withstand 1,000 pounds of pressure per square inch. Fur-
ther suppose that a particular manufacturer designed its landing gear to withstand 3,000
pounds of pressure per square inch. If the landing gear collapsed on a particular landing
and a plaintiff proved that a faulty molding had reduced the strength of the landing gear
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given preemptive effect, this would pose no obstacle to a plaintiff who
could prove, for instance, that the steering mechanism of his aircraft
was damaged or incorrectly assembled when it left the manufacturer.
In light of these differences, the regulatory reforms proposed in
this Note are directed only toward products liability lawsuits based on
claims of defective design. The author mentions this categorical focus
for clarification purposes only. Focusing on only one of the three pos-
sible types of products liability claims will not deter from the ability of
this Note's proposed regulatory reforms to significantly reduce the
number of illegitimate lawsuits allegedly paralyzing the general avia-
tion industry. The vast majority of products liability lawsuits arising
from crashes of general aviation aircraft are based on claims of defec-
tive design.""
3. The Effect of Products Liability on General Aviation
In the United States, product safety is often governed by both the
regulatory and tort systems." 9 In the field of general aviation safety,
however, the regulatory system has taken a subordinate role to that
assumed by state tort systems. This fact is hardly surprising. Because
compliance with federal aviation safety standards does not preempt
products liability lawsuits, juries have been free to implement their
own standards of aircraft safety and have routinely held general avia-
tion aircraft manufacturers to higher standards than federal law re-
quires. What is startling, however, is the impact that this practice has
allegedly had on the general aviation industry.
By the late 1960s, products liability litigation had become a seri-
ous impediment to general aviation manufacturers. 120 Historically,
about eighty percent of all general aviation aircraft in service in the
United States have been produced by three large manufacturers. 121
Cessna Aircraft Company and Piper Aircraft Corporation emerged as
to half of the manufacturer's design standard strength, the manufacturer could claim that
the actipn is preempted because the strength of the landing gear, even with a manufactur-
ing defect, exceeded the requirement of the FARs. This is an extreme example. If it oc-
curred, however, and the weakness of the landing gear was truly the cause of the accident,
it would be an example of a design standard that was clearly out of date. Part II.B.4 of this
Note suggests methods by which outdated design standards could be revamped and
brought up-to-date. Under these methods, until such designs were brought up-to-date,
states would maintain the authority to set such standards.
118 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 12, at 457 ("[General aviation] crashes lead to claims of
product defective design much more often than to claims of defective manufacture.");
Martin, supra note 3, at 481 ("Because airplanes must be designed and built to be very
reliable, almost all aviation product liability cases have involved claims of defective
design.").
1 19 Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Ac-
tions, 41 VAND. L. Ray. 1121, 1122 (1988).
120 Martin, supra note 3, at 481.
121 Id. at 480.
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the dominant manufacturers of small, single engine, two- and four-
passenger airplanes. 122 Beech Aircraft Corporation concentrated on
the manufacture of somewhat larger and more expensive aircraft.123
In 1975, Beech and Cessna estimated that the two companies
spent a combined total of over $9 million on products liability insur-
ance and defense that year alone. 24 This total exceeded $10 million
per year by the end of 1976.125 By 1977, the three major U.S. general
aviation manufacturers found themselves defending hundreds of law-
suits, the claims of which far exceeded the net worth of the three com-
panies combined. 12 6 Management and design engineers alike found
their attention turning from building general aviation aircraft to de-
fending their companies from products liability lawsuits.' 2 7
The General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), as well
as several independent commentators, have proclaimed a causal link
between the decline of the general aviation industry and the prolifera-
tion of products liability lawsuits.'2 8 Their arguments focus on the
rise of defense and liability insurance costs. According to one com-
mentator, the 1970s saw an "upward spiral" of products liability loss
and defense costs. 12 9 Aside from debilitating legal defense fees, man-
ufacturers were also hit with increased insurance premiums.' 3 0 These
mounting costs were inevitably passed on to the consumer and new
general aviation aircraft became prohibitively more expensive.' 3 '
During the 1980s, the price of new general aviation aircraft
soared, forcing prospective buyers to purchase used aircraft.' 3 2 In
1987, the three main U.S. manufacturers calculated that their annual
product liability costs ranged from $70,000 to $100,000 per aircraft
built that year.'3 3 For two- to four-seat general aviation aircraft, this
meant that "the product liability expense exceeded the cost of either
raw materials or labor."'l 4 Furthermore, this increase in product lia-
bility costs came at a time when fatalities from general aviation acci-
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 481-82.
125 Id. at 482.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See GAMA, supra note 2; see also Martin, supra note 3, at 480-86; George L. Priest,
Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237, 259-62 (1992).
129 Martin, supra note 3, at 483.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.; see also GAMA, supra note 2, at 5.
133 Martin, supra note 3, at 484; see also GAMA, supra note 2, at 1; Priest, supra note 128,
at 259 ("In 1986, it was reported that liability insurance costs added $80,000 to the price of
each Beech aircraft and $75,000 to each Piper aircraft.").
134 Martin, supra note 3, at 484.
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dents were at their lowest in forty years.' 3 5 Since World War II, for
example, the incidence of fatal accidents has declined by 700%.136
Nevertheless, as both sales and profits decreased, manufacturing facil-
ities were closed, factory employees were laid off, and-for the first
time in history-imports of general aviation aircraft exceeded the
value of general aviation exports.' 3 7 In short, the 1980s brought disas-
ter to the American general aviation industry.
Today, the situation has not changed. As President Clinton re-
flected when signing into law the General Aviation Revitalization Act
of 1994, "[a]n innovative and productive American industry has been
pushed to the edge of extinction." 3 8 Illustrative of this phenomenon
is a recent four-year period during which Beech Aircraft Corporation
was sued 203 times for accidents involving its aircraft. 3 9 Despite the
fact that the NTSB did not find Beech equipment to be defective in
any of the cases, each lawsuit cost Beech an average of $530,000 to
defend. 4 In other words, what government investigators established
as "zero-defect performance" ended up costing Beech hundreds of
millions of dollars.' 4 '
Speaking for general aviation aircraft manufacturers as a whole,
GAMA left the 1980s claiming that "[tihe general aviation industry
needs tort reform legislation to save it from destruction." 42 Con-
vinced that products liability is the cause of the general aviation crisis,
Cessna chairman Russ Meyer promised that his company would once
again enter the small plane market as soon as tort reform legislation
was passed. 43 General aviation manufacturers in the United States
seem to agree that in order to save their industry from collapse, tort
reform legislation is necessary. Beech chairman and CEO Art Wegner
called the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 a "great step
forward," while Piper's president, Charles M. Suma, said the bill's pas-
sage was "the icing on the cake" for the company's creditors, who are
135 Priest, supra note 128, at 260.
136 GAMA, supra note 2, at 1; see also Craig, supra note 12, at 456.
137 Martin, supra note 3, at 484. In 1980, 29 U.S. general aviation manufacturers com-
peted for sales with only 15 foreign manufacturers; by 1992 29 foreign general aviation
manufacturers competed against only nine U.S. manufacturers. 140 CONG. REc. H5000
(daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of Rep. Clinger).
138 Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing S. 1458, 30 WKLY CoMP.
PS. Doc. 1678 (Aug. 22, 1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 1654 [hereinafter Clinton].
139 GAMA, supra note 2, at 4.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1.
143 Mark R. Twombly, Kil the Messenger, AOPA PILOT, Aug. 1993, at 125. With the
passage of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Meyer insists that he will "honor
[his] commitment to restart production," although he admits the process may take up to
two years to be put in motion. Thomas A. Home, Manufacturers Face the Future, AOPA
PLOT, Sept. 1994, at 5.
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close to being granted ownership of the company.'4 Warren
Hoffner, president of the American Bonanza Society (a publication
for Beech aircraft owners), was one of many general aviation insiders
rallying support for an even broader tort reform bill.145 That bill, Sen-
ate Bill 67, recently failed to pass its fifth consecutive term of
Congress.' 46
C. Recent Congressional Movement Toward Tort Reform
1. The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994
On August 17, 1994 President Clinton signed into law the Gen-
eral Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (the 1994 Act),147 the first ma-
jor piece of products liability legislation to have ever been passed by
Congress. 148 The 1994 Act represents the culmination of over eight
years of lobbing by general aviation manufacturers and their support-
ers in Congress to provide "some predictability to an industry which
has stopped building small airplanes because of liability costs."149
The 1994 Act establishes a statute of repose' 50 that bars products
liability lawsuits against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft or
their component parts once the aircraft or component is over eight-
een years old.151 In addition, the statute of repose is "rolling"-when
144 Home, supra note 143, at 6.
145 Warren E. Hoffner, President's Comments: Product Liability General Aviation Crisis,
1993 AM. BONANZA Soc'y 3276, 3277.
146 Telephone Interview with Mike Horak, Press Secretary to Senator Nancy Kas-
sebaum (Nov. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Horak).
147 Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994); Clinton, supra note 138, at 1678, re-
printed in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 1654.
148 140 CONG. REc. H8698 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
149 140 CONG. REc. H5001 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
150 The theory behind a statute of repose is that after a product has been safely used
for a specified number of years, it is reasonable to assume that the product was adequately
designed and manufactured. Supporters of statutes of repose argue that after such time
has passed, it is no longer fair to hold manufacturers liable for accidents or injuries sus-
tained by users of their products. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. H4999 (daily ed.June 27, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Fish). As many as 14 states currently have statutes of repose, some as
long as 12 years and others as short as six years. S. REP. No. 202, supra note 7, at n.12. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1992) (12 years); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.905 (1988)
(eight years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (Supp. 1994) (10 years).
In Carr v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 758 F. Supp 1330, 1333 (D. Ariz 1991), a federal
district court upheld the constitutionality, at both the state and federal levels, of Arizona's
product liability statute of repose. The language of the Arizona statute is similar to that of
many existing statutes of repose:
A product liability action ... shall be commenced [within the state's two
year statute of limitations], except that no product liability action may be
commenced and prosecuted if the cause of action accrues more than twelve
years after the product was first sold for use or consumption, unless the
cause of action is based upon the negligence of the manufacturer or seller
or a breach of an express warranty provided by the manufacturer or seller.
ARuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1992).
151 The 1994 Act provides that
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a component part in an aircraft is replaced with a new component
part, the replacement part is assigned a new eighteen-year limitation
period, independent of the limitation period covering the rest of the
aircraft. 52
The statute's eighteen-year limitation period contains several ex-
ceptions. For example, the statute of repose does not apply if a manu-
facturer knowingly misrepresented, concealed, or withheld safety
information from the FAA during the certification process of the air-
craft in question. 53 There is also an exception for passengers trans-
ported for medical emergencies and persons injured by the aircraft
while on the ground or in other aircraft.1'i The statute preserves lia-
bility for actions based on breach of an express warranty by excepting
from its limitation period actions brought pursuant to a written and
enforceable warranty.' 55
Subsection 2 (d) of the 1994 Act preempts state statutes of repose,
providing that the new federal statute of repose "supersedes any State
law to the extent that such law permits a civil action.., to be brought
after the applicable limitation period for such civil action established
by subsection (a)."' 56 The 1994 Act took effect on August 17, 1994,
the date President Clinton signed it into law.' 57 However, the 1994
Act does not apply to civil actions commenced prior to that date. 58
By the time President Clinton signed the 1994 Act into law, it had
survived an attempt at amendment by the House of Representa-
[N] o civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to
property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may
be brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of
any new component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its
capacity as a manufacturer if the accident occurred ... after the applicable
limitation period beginning on ... the date of delivery of the aircraft to its
first purchaser or lessee... or... the date of first delivery of the aircraft to
a person in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft.
§ 2(a), 108 Stat. at 1552. Section 3(3) of the Act defines the "limitation period" as 18 years.
§ 3(3), 108 Stat. at 1553.
152 § 2(a)(2), 108 Stat. at 1552. The 18-year period of limitation extends to new com-
ponent parts installed as replacements for original, or added, component parts-hence,
the "rolling" statute of repose. A new component that is added to a new aircraft receives
the same limitation period as the aircraft on which it is installed. Although the 1994 Act
does not expressly address used replacement parts (or rebuilt parts, for that matter), Rep-
resentative Glickman insists that a used component part which had, say, five years left on its
original limitations period would maintain its five-year limitation period if installed on a
different aircraft. 140 CONG. Rxc. H5001 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Glickman).
153 § 2(b)(1), 108 Stat. at 1552-53.
'54 § 2(b)(2)-(3), 108 Stat. at 1553.
155 § 2(b)(4), 108 Stat. at 1553.
156 § 2(d), 108 Stat. at 1553.
157 See § 4(a), 108 Stat. at 1554; Clinton, supra note 138, at 1678, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.CAN. 1654.
158 § 4(b), 108 Stat. at 1554.
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tives,' 59 had managed to gain the support of several consumer
groups,1 60 and had even been labelled as a "job-creating and job-re-
storing measure."'16 Though this simple piece of tort reform legisla-
tion was viewed as a major triumph for small aircraft manufacturers, it
was not the only piece of tort reform legislation introduced into Con-
gress in 1993 on behalf of the general aviation industry.
2. Senate Bill 67
On January 21, 1993, Senator Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas intro-
duced the General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act 162 (Sen-
ate Bill 67) into its fifth consecutive term of Congress.' 63 Senate Bill
67 is a considerably more comprehensive tort reform measure that,
until the passage of the 1994 Act, garnered significant support from
general aviation aircraft manufacturers. If passed, the bill would pur-
portedly "replace the current patchwork of unpredictable and incon-
sistent State general aviation liability laws with uniform, fair, and
reasonable Federal standards of liability."16 4 In other words, unlike
the more narrowly focused approach to tort reform found in the 1994
Act, Senate Bill 67 would essentially create a unique federal law of
products liability, applicable only to lawsuits involving general aviation
accidents, that would supplant existing tort law in each of the fifty
states as applied to general aviation accident cases.
While proponents of the 1994 Act claim that it will save general
aviation manufacturers millions of dollars in settlements, judgments,
and defense costs stemming from accidents involving their older
products, Senator Kassebaum's Senate Bill 67 proposes to do this, and
159 Instead of the uniform 18-year statute of repose imposed by the 1994 Act, an
amendment introduced by Representative Rick Boucher of Virginia proposed a sliding
scale, trifurcated approach. See 140 CONG. REc. H4998 (daily ed.June 27, 1994). For pis-
ton-powered aircraft the amendment provided a statute of repose of 15 years; for turbo-
prop-powered aircraft, the statute of repose would have been 18 years; and forjet-powered
and other remaining general aviation aircraft, the statute of repose would have been 22
years. Id. The amendment was intended to target the production of piston-powered air-
craft. 140 CONG. REc. H4999 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of Rep. Brooks). This
area has not only traditionally generated the most jobs, but is also the industry's greatest
source of liability. Id.
160 It seems odd that the persons most likely to be injured in a general aviation acci-
dent-the consumers who purchase and fly the planes-would support such a law. How-
ever, these consumers are also the individuals most directly impacted by the high cost of
general aviation aircraft, allegedly the result of excessive products liability lawsuits. Con-
sumer supporters of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 included the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association, the Experimental Aircraft Association, the National Busi-
ness Aircraft Association, and the National Air Transport Association. 140 CONG. REC.
H5000 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of Rep. Oberstar).
161 Clinton, supra note 138, at 1678, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.N. 1654.
162 S. 67, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1998) [hereinafter S. 67].
163 Horak, supra note 146; see, e.g., S. 640, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
164 139 CONG. REc. S195 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
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much more.16 5 Most significantly, section 5(b) (1) of Senate Bill 67
sets forth a uniform standard of liability that would be applied in ac-
tions for damages resulting from an alleged defect in an aircraft or
one of its component parts. Under the proposed standard, a plaintiff
would be required to establish certain elements in order to recover
damages from a general aviation manufacturer:
(A) the product, when it left the control of the manufacturer, was in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended pur-
pose, according to engineering and manufacturing practices which
were reasonably feasible;
(B) the defective condition is a proximate cause of the claimant's
harm; and
(C) the general aviation aircraft was being used at the time of the
accident for a purpose and in a manner for which it was designed
and manufactured. 166
Unlike Tentative Draft 1 and current trends in products liability law,
this vague standard makes no distinction between actions based on
manufacturing defects and those based on design defects.' 6 7
In addition to the liability standard set forth above, Senate Bill 67
would provide a basis for liability for failure to warn by requiring that
manufacturers warn consumers about any dangers the manufacturer
was aware of, or reasonably should have been aware of, either at the
time of sale or after the product was sold.1r The proposed legislation
would also impose liability for breach of an express warranty. 169 If a
manufacturer was to make an express warranty about its product, and
the product, in failing to conform to such warranty, was determined
to be the "proximate cause of the claimant's harm," the manufacturer
could be held liable for breach of its express warranty.' 70 Although
Senate Bill 67 would not change existing law with respect to express
warranties, one commentator claims such legislation would prevent
recovery under a theory of implied warranty.' 7 1
165 When introduced by Senator Kassebaum, S. 67 included a 20-year statute of repose.
The shorter period of limitations of the 1994 Act (18 years) is more favorable to manufac-
turers. Future general aviation tort reform legislation (such as a reintroduced S. 67) may
attempt to shorten the current 18-year period of limitations. The original version of S. 67,
for example, introduced by Senator Kassebaum in 1989, included a 12-year statute of re-
pose. S. 640, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
166 S. 67, supra note 162, § 5(b)(1)(A)-(G).
167 For criticisms of the bill's misguided justification, its failure to recognize the dis-
tinction between manufacturing and design defects, and the overwhelming bias it would
provide to manufacturers in lawsuits involving general aviation accidents, see infra part
HAS; see also Wells, supra note 8, at 905-12.
168 S.67, supra note 162, § 5(b)(2)(A)-(B).
169 Id. § 5(b)(3)(D).
170 Id.
171 Wells, supra note 8, at 916-17.
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Another major provision of Senate Bill 67 mandates the use of
comparative responsibility analysis in all actions for harm arising out
of general aviation accidents. 172 Under the principles of comparative
responsibility, liability is apportioned between the parties involved in a
lawsuit based on each party's responsibility for the harm caused: "The
trier of fact shall determine comparative responsibility by making find-
ings indicating the percentage of total responsibility for the claimant's
harm attributable to the claimant, each defendant, each third-party
defendant, and any other person not a party to the action." 73 Unlike
the law of contributory negligence-where a plaintiff recovers noth-
ing if he or she is at all contributorily negligent-a plaintiff under
Senate Bill 67's comparative responsibility rule could recover a defen-
dant's "share of liability" despite the fact that the plaintiff was respon-
sible for "a share" of his injuries.' 74
While implementing comparative responsibility, Senate Bill 67
would also do away with joint and several liability-defendants could
be severally but notjointly liable.175 The proposed legislation would,
however, retain two exceptions to this rule. First, a general aviation
airframe manufacturer could be jointly and severally liable for harm
caused by components installed by it as part of an aircraft's "original
type design."'176 Second, general aviation component manufacturers
could be jointly and severally liable for harm caused by subassemblies
or other parts of their components. 177
Like many aspects of tort law, the rules regarding the apportion-
ment of liability vary greatly from state to state, with over forty-three
states embracing some form of comparative fault analysis. 178 The ma-
jority of states embrace one of several forms of "modified" compara-
tive fault,179 under which a plaintiff is barred from recovery if his or
her proportion of responsibility exceeds a certain percentage. 80
172 S. 67, supra note 162, § 6(a).
173 Id.
174 Wells, supra note 8, at 918-19. While lay juries are arguably not qualified to decide
the complex technical issues often involved in general aviation lawsuits, asking such juries
to make findings indicating "the percentage of total responsibility for the claimant's harm
attributable to the claimant," see S. 67, supra note 162, § 6(a), seems even more difficult to
justify. For a forceful argument that problems of conscious product design choices are
inherently unsuited to determination by courts, see James A. Henderson, Jr., Design Defect
Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 541,555-57 (1976);James A. Henderson,Jr.,Judicial
Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1531, 1540 (1973).
175 S. 67, supra note 162, § 6(b).
176 Id. § 6(c)(1).
177 Id. § 6(c)(2).
178 See, e.g., HENDERSON & TwEmsvi, supra note 74, at 316-19.
179 Id. at 317.
180 Id. In Colorado, for example, a partially negligent plaintiff may recover damages
from a defendant proportionate to the defendant's fault unless the plaintiff's fault reaches
50%; once the plaintiff is more responsible for his or her harm than the defendant, the
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Most other states employ a simpler variation known as "pure" compar-
ative fault.'81 Under this rule, unless a plaintiff is 100% responsible
for his or her harm, the plaintiff's recovery will be reduced commen-
surate to his fault, but never eliminated.182 With the passage of legis-
lation such as Senate Bill 67, however, "pure" comparative
responsibility would be the rule in every state with respect to general
aviation accident liability.' 83 No matter how egregious a pilot's error
may be, Senate Bill 67 would allow a jury to determine that a small
percentage of what is usually a very large amount of damages must be
borne by the aircraft's manufacturer.
Not surprisingly, the other major provisions of Senate Bill 67
seem heavily biased in favor of general aviation aircraft manufactur-
ers. These provisions include: (1) limiting the admissibility of evi-
dence of any remedial measures made by the manufacturer following
an accident that, if made before the accident, might have prevented
the accident; 84 (2) allowing punitive damages only in situations
where the actions of the responsible party constituted a "conscious,
flagrant indifference to the safety of those persons who might be
harmed by use of the... aircraft"; 8 5 (3) creating a two-year statute of
limitations running from the time of the accident; 8 6 and (4) placing
concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving general aviation accidents
with federal and state courts.' 8 7
It is not surprising that the more measured response found in the
1994 Act was able to pass both houses of Congress before the broader
tort reform measures proposed by Senate Bill 67. The 1994 Act was
comprised merely of one of several components-a statute of re-
pose-that many more inclusive tort reform bills of the past had taken
with them to their legislative graves.' 88 General aviation aircraft man-
ufacturers are now free from multimillion-dollar settlements orjudg-
ments-but only with respect to their older aircraft and components.
Over 80,000 general aviation aircraft flying in the United States re-
plaintiff may not collect any damages from the defendant. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-
111(1) (1987); see Grafv. Tracy, 568 P.2d 467, 468 (Colo. 1977) (holding thatjury finding
of 70% plaintiff fault precluded recovery under state comparative negligence statute).
181 HENDERSON & TwERSI, supra note 74, at 317.
182 Id. In Rhode Island, for example, "the amount of negligence attributable to the
person injured" is used to reduce damages, but not to bar a recovery. RI. GEN. LAws § 9-
20-4 (1985); see Raymond v. Jenard, 390 A.2d 358, 361 (RI. 1978) (stating that state com-
parative negligence statute is necessary to abolish harshness of traditional contributory
negligence rule).
183 Wells, supra note 8, at 920.
184 S. 67, supra note 162, § 8.
185 Id. § 10.
186 Id. § 11.
187 Id. § 13.
188 See, e.g., S. 67, supra note 162.
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main unaffected by the new legislation.'8 9 Moreover, this figure does
not include the thousands of new aircraft that manufacturers such as
Cessna promised would be built following the passage of the 1994 Act.
Although Senator Kassebaum's Senate Bill 67 was sidetracked in Con-
gress again this year, 90 the momentum created by the passage of the
1994 Act will no doubt support a continuing campaign for more com-
prehensive general aviation tort reform.' 91
D. Federal Preemption in the General Aviation Industry
1. The Two Faces of Federal Preemption
Both pieces of tort reform legislation introduced into the 103d
Congress on behalf of the general aviation industry included express
preemption clauses. Section 2(d) of the 1994 Act establishes it as a
uniform federal statute of repose governing all products liability ac-
tions brought against general aviation manufacturers, regardless of
any state law to the contrary. Section 4(a) of Senate Bill 67 would, if
such legislation was passed, similarly preempt any state law regarding
recovery, under any legal theory, for harm arising out of a general
aviation accident.
GAMA has consistently maintained that tort reform measures
such as these, strengthened by their express preemption clauses, are
needed to save the general aviation industry. 92 However, general avi-
ation manufacturers often adopt a different strategy when they enter a
courtroom. Instead of attempting to persuade the courts to bend ex-
isting tort principles in their favor, general aviation manufacturers
and their attorneys often frame their defenses around a slightly differ-
ent concept of federal preemption. 93 This alternative federal pre-
emption theory, however, is not mentioned in either piece of
legislation recently supported by the general aviation industry.
Instead of concentrating on products liability law, the alternative
theory of federal preemption often raised by manufacturers concen-
trates on federal regulatory law-namely, the federal regulations
189 Thomas B. Chapman, Working the Hill AOPA PILOT, Sept. 1994, at 2, 4 (graph).
190 Suits and Small Planes, CHICAGO TMB., Aug. 25, 1994, at 29.
191 Tort reform was a popular topic in Congress during the first several months of
1995. See Neil A. Lewis, House Passes New Standards Limiting Awards in Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1995, at 1.
192 GAMA, supra note 2, at 1-2.
193 See, e.g., Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir.) (discuss-
ing defendant's assertion that the Federal Aviation Act impliedly preempted the state tort
claims being brought against it), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); Holliday v. Bell Helicop-
ters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396, 1398 (D. Haw. 1990) (discussing defendant's argu-




promulgated under the Federal Aviation Act.194 Manufacturers often
use a "slippery slope" argument to justify their position: "[I]f this
court allows plaintiff's claim to proceed, it will render federal regula-
tions meaningless and invite 'partisan experts retained for litigation'
to dictate aviation standards."1 95 Although this argument seems per-
suasive-i.e., why has Congress enacted safety regulations for general
aviation manufacturers if everyone but the manufacturers themselves
are allowed to ignore them?-the Tenth Circuit in Cleveland made it
clear that where the Federal Aviation Act is concerned, rates and
routes are the only areas for which Congress has expressly authorized
federal preemption. 196 However, the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of
Congress' intent does not foreclose the possibility that the industry
may benefit from regulatory reform legislation that would bestow pre-
emptive status on federal air safety regulations.
2. The Preemptive Effect of Federal Regulatory Standards
Since the early 1930s, the number and importance of federal reg-
ulatory agencies in the United States has increased significantly.' 97 As
such agencies assume greater responsibility for regulating the produc-
tion and use of products in this country, issues of federal preemption
become increasingly more important.198 Article VI of the United
States Constitution provides that the laws of the United States "shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 99 In cases involv-
ing the regulation of a product's design, for example, federal preemp-
tion occurs when a court determines that pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, federal regulation concern-
ing the product precludes nonconforming state regulation concern-
ing the same aspect of the product.200
194 For an overview of the Federal Aviation Act and the regulations promulgated there-
under, see supra part IA.1; see also Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1442.
195 HoUiday, 747 F. Supp. at 1399.
196 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1444.
197 See, e.g., CHARL--s SCHULTZE, THE PUBUC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 7-12 (1977), re-
printed in WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 7 (8th ed. 1987).
198 HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 74, at 409. This is especially true for industries
such as general aviation. According to Representative Dan Glickman, "Ihere is no other
industry selling products to the public in which all of its segments are exclusively regulated
by the Federal Government." 140 CONG. REc. H5001 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement
of Rep. Glickman).
199 U.S. GONST., art. VI, cI. 2.
200 See, e.g., Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 408 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding
that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act impliedly preempted state common
law claim (or a state statute requiring the same result) alleging that the failure to equip an
automobile with airbags rendered its design defective).
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When a court analyzes an issue of federal preemption, "[t] he pur-
pose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone."201 Federal preemption
may be either "express" or "implied."20 2 Upon examining the text of
the statute in question, a court may find that Congress "expressly" pre-
empted state law.203 Express preemption clauses, such as section
1305 (a) of the Federal Aviation Act,20 4 exemplify the explicit congres-
sional intent necessary for express preemption. 20 5 In the absence of
an express preemption clause, courts examine the "structure and pur-
pose" of a statute to determine whether Congress intended it to "im-
pliedly" preempt state law.20 6 Generally, state law must yield "if that
law actually conflicts with federal law."20 7 In addition, a court may
also find that state law is impliedly preempted if federal regulation is
sufficiently pervasive in a particular field to support an inference that
Congress left no room for state regulation.208 If a court finds either
express or implied congressional intent to preempt, it must often ad-
ditionally determine whether Congress intended state law to preempt
state common law actions as well as state regulation.20 9
A recent Supreme Court decision, Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.,210 illustrates the unexpected difficulties often associated with the
201 Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
202 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. De ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982)).
203 See, e.g., Wood, 865 F.2d at 401.
204 49 U.S.C. app § 1305(a) (1988).
205 See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
206 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
207 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992); see also Wood, 865
F.2d at 402 (holding that to allow a product liability action for defective design would
"stand as an obstacle" to the regulatory scheme of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act).
208 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)); see also Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S.
566, 569 (1919) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission so thoroughly regu-
lated the safety of railroad car construction that state law could not even supplement such
areas of regulation).
209 The First Circuit in Wood explicitly addressed this issue:
[A finding for the plaintiff on her defective design claim] is tantamount to
announcing a state safety standard (vehicles must have airbags) that differs
from the federal safety standard covering the same aspect of performance
(viz., the relevant federal standard permits seat belts in lieu of air bags).
Such a safety standard, if promulgated by state statute or regulation, would
be preempted by the clear commands of § 1392(d). Is the same standard
preempted even though created by lawsuit?
865 F.2d at 401 (citation omitted). The court held that the lawsuit was impliedly pre-
empted by the federal statute. Id. at 408.
210 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). The procedural history of the case hints at the difficulties
underlying the final decision. Cipollone began in a NewJersey federal district court, 593 F.
Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), whose holding was reversed by the Third Circuit on an interloc-
utory appeal, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986). After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987), the district court again heard the case, 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986),
only to have it remanded back to them after a second appeal to the Third Circuit, 893 F.2d
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application of the federal preemption doctrine. In Cipollone, the
Supreme Court interpreted the preemption provision of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (Cigarette Act).211
Rose Cipollone smoked cigarettes from 1942 until she died from lung
cancer in 1984.212 On August 1, 1983, she and her husband filed a
complaint in federal district court alleging that Rose had developed
lung cancer as a result of smoking cigarettes manufactured by the de-
fendant.213 The couple's theories of recovery, all predicated on New
Jersey law, included claims of design defect214 and failure to warn.21 5
Since the enactment of the Cigarette Act, cigarette manufacturers
have been fairly successful at using federal preemption as a shield
against products liability actions based on state common law alleging
failure to warn of the harmful effects of cigarette smoking.216 The
Cigarette Act's express preemption clause provides that "[n] o require-
ment or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this chapter."217 This provision, added to the Act in
1969, amended the 1965 Act's original preemption provision.218 The
amended provision bars not simply "statements," as the earlier provi-
sion did, but rather "requirement[s] or prohibitions . . . imposed
under State law."219
541 (3d Cir. 1990). By the time the Supreme Court finally granted certiorari, 499 U.S. 935
(1991), both of the original claimants had died.
211 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988). The Cigarette Act requires that a conspicuous label
warning of the health hazards of smoking be placed on every package of cigarettes sold in
the United States.
212 Cipolone, 112 S. Ct at 2613.
213 Id. at 2613-14.
214 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' cigarettes were defectively designed as a
result of the defendants' failure to employ a safer alternative design for a product that
caused more harm to society than good. Id. at 2614..
215 The plaintiffs alleged that "the product was 'defective as a result of [the defend-
ants'] failure to provide adequate warnings of the health consequences of cigarette smok-
ing' . . . and that [the defendants] 'were negligent, in the manner [that] they tested,
researched, sold, promoted, and advertised' their cigarettes." Id.
216 See, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding that plaintiffs' state failure to warn claim was "implicitly preempted" because it
conflicted with the purpose of the Cigarette Act); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d
620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the Cigarette Act impliedly preempted plaintiffs'
state failure to warn claim because it "disturb[ed] the federally calibrated balance of na-
tional interests").
217 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988).
218 Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5(b), 84 Stat. 87 (1970). The Cigarette Act's original preemp-
tion provision read: "No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provi-
sions of this Act." Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5(b),. 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
219 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988).
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Prior to the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, 220 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld its earlier deci-
sion that "'the [Cigarette] Act [impliedly] preempts those state law
damage actions relating to smoking and health that challenge ... the
propriety of a party's actions with respect to the advertising and pro-
motion of cigarettes.'" 221 As a result of the Third Circuit's earlier rul-
ing, the district court had barred the plaintiffs' failure to warn,
fraudulent misrepresentation, express warranty, and conspiracy to de-
fraud claims "to the extent that they sought to challenge the defend-
ants' advertising, promotional, and public relations activities" that
took place after the enactment of the Cigarette Act.222 Despite the
plaintiffs' vehement protestations, the Third Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's construction of its earlier preemption decision.2 23
Although the Supreme Court generally agreed with the Third
Circuit that the Cigarette Act preempted state law damage actions, the
Court arrived at its conclusion in a more direct fashion. First, the
Supreme Court partially overruled the Third Circuit in holding that
instead of impliedly preempting the claims brought by the Cipollone
family, the Cigarette Act's preemption provision indicated an express
congressional intent to preempt state authority:224
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing
that issue, and when that provision provides a "reliable indicium of
congressional intent with respect to state authority," "there is no
need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the
substantive provisions" of the legislation. 225
Furthermore, unlike the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court found that
the Cigarette Act's 1965 and 1969 preemption provisions differed sub-
stantially from one another.226 The Court, therefore, narrowed its fo-
220 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 499 U.S. 935 (1991).
221 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 582 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986)), afl'd inpart andrev'd inpar
112 S. Ct. 2608 (1993). Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari, four federal courts
of appeals followed the Third Circuit's original determination that the Cigarette Act
preempts state law damage actions that challenge the propriety of a party's actions with
respect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes. See Pennington v. Visitron Corp.,
876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.
1987); Palmer v. Liggett Group, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American Brands,
Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987).
222 Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 582; see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664,
668-75 (D.NJ. 1986).
223 Cipollone 893 F.2d at 582.
224 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
225 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505
(1978)).
226 Id. at 2619.
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cus to the "domain expressly pre-empted" by each of the Act's
successive preemption clauses.227
As a result of its narrower wording, section five of the 1965 Ciga-
rette Act was found by the Court to have preempted only "state and
federal rule-making bodies from mandating particular cautionary
statements." 228 In other words, the 1965 Act did not preempt state
common law damages actions such as those brought by the Cipollone
family.229 The Court found, on the other hand, that the Act's 1969
preemption provision commanded a much broader preemptive ef-
fect.2 30 Such a change in scope, according to the Court, was evident
from "substantial changes in wording" and the 1969 Act's overall revi-
sions to the law.231 Unlike its 1965 predecessor, section five of the
1969 Act preempts more than state regulations mandating particular
warning labels.232 The critical question for the. Cipollone family,
therefore, was "how much more?"
Of particular importance to the question of whether section five
of the 1969 Cigarette Act preempts products liability actions based on
state common law is the fact that the provision does not expressly in-
clude common law within its preemptive reach.233 Equally important
is the absence from the Act of a savings clause that expressly preserves
common law actions.234 Nevertheless, the Court determined that
227 Id. at 2618.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 2619.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. In one of its more instructive comments, the Court emphasized that simply
because the preemptive scope of the 1969 provision was not limited to state regulations did
not mean that the section preempted all common law actions. Id. at 2621. "[The 1969
preemption provision] does not generally pre-empt state-law obligations to avoid market-
ing cigarettes with manufacturing defects or to use a demonstrably safer alternative de-
sign...." Id.
See generally supra note 114 and part I.B.2. The Cigarette Act establishes federal warn-
ing requirements. Therefore, its preemptive effect does not reach claims based on mann-
facturing defects or claims based on defective design. Similarly, the federal air safety
regulations under the Federal Aviation Act establish federal design standards. If these
standards were to be given preemptive effect (as this Note proposes), the scope of their
preemptive effect would not reach claims based on manufacturing defects or claims based
on failure to adequately instruct or warn.
233 This fact would seem to favor the Cipollone family's position that Congress did not
intend the Act to preempt common law claims, or at least not the common law claims they
were bringing before the Court.
As the Court points out in a footnote, Congress has expressly included common law
rules within the preemptive reach of other statutes. Cipollone 112 S. Ct. at 2621 n.22 (dis-
cussing 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-17(d) (1988), which states that shared appreciation mortgages
for single family housing shall not be subject to any "State constitution, statute, court de-
cree, common law, rule, or public policy").
234 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621 n.22. This fact would seem to favor the defendants'
position that Congress intended to preempt common law claims, or at least the claims
being brought by the Cipollone family. Congress has, of course, included savings clauses
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"Congress was neither pre-empting nor saving common law as a
whole-it was simply pre-empting particular common law claims,
while saving others."23 5 To determine which common law claims were
within the scope of the Act's preemption clause, the Court set out a
"central inquiry" through which it examined each category of dam-
ages actions in turn. 2 36 Upon examining each claim, the Court simply
asked "whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common law
damages action" satisfies the express terms of the preemption clause,
giving those terms a "fair but narrow reading."23 7 Under the Court's
"central inquiry," which focuses on both the precise wording of the
preemption clause and the individual nature of each and every com-
mon law claim, a poorly drafted preemption clause would provide a
manufacturer with only limited protection from liability.238
In applying this test to the Cipollones' failure to warn claims,239
for instance, the Court held that the "[p]etitioner's claims are pre-
empted to the extent that they rely on a state law 'requirement or
prohibition ... with respect to... advertising or promotion.' -240 In
other words, to the extent that the Cipollones' failure to warn claims
required a showing that the defendants' "post-1969 advertising or pro-
motions should have included additional, or more clearly stated,
warnings, those claims [were] pre-empted."241 Other common law
claims, however, such as those attacking practices unrelated to "adver-
tising or promotion," were not preempted by the Cigarette Act.242 In
the end, the Cipollone Court established a methodology which courts
will use in future products liability actions to determine the breadth
and applicability of express preemption clauses.
in other statutes-the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is a prime example. See 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1506 (1988).
235 Cipolone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621 n.22.
236 Id. at 2621.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 The Cipollones offered two theories concerning the defendants' failure to warn:
first, that the defendants "'were negligent in the manner [that] they tested, researched,
sold, promoted, and advertised' their cigarettes"; second, that the defendants "failed to
provide 'adequate warnings of the health consequences of cigarette smoking.'" Id. (altera-
tion in original).
240 Id. (incorporating the language of the Cigarette Act's preemption provision).
241 Id. at 2621-22.
242 Id. at 2622. The Court considered the Cipollones' numerous other claims under
this rubric, with varying results. Id. at 2623-25. While the Court's specific findings with
respect to these additional claims are instructive as to the application of the Court's "cen-
tral inquiry," they are not crucial to this part of this Note. These additional holdings are
discussed in greater detail in this Note's analysis. See infra part IT.B.4.
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3. Federal Preemption and the Federal Aviation Act
As the Tenth Circuit emphasized in Cleveland,243 "Congress may
reserve for the federal government the exclusive right to regulate
safety in a given field, yet permit the states to maintain tort remedies
covering much the same territory."244 According to the Tenth Circuit,
Congress intended such a mutual coexistence of state common law
remedies with federal regulation when it structured the Federal Air
Safety Regulations. 245 Thus, in applying the "central inquiry" of Cipol-
lone to the Federal Aviation Act, the Cleveland court concluded that it
was not the intention of Congress to preempt products liability law-
suits that allege an aircraft was defectively designed.2 46
On appeal, Piper argued that the district court in Cleveland "erred
in denying its motion for summary judgment on preemption
grounds."247 In light of the Federal Aviation Act's lack of an express
preemption clause governing general air safety, Piper's argument was
based on implied preemption.2 48 The district court, however, cited
the plain language of the Act as evidence that Congress did not intend
to exclude state common law actions from the field of general aviation
safety.2 4 9 Citing the Supreme Court's holding in Cipollone, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment.250
According to the Tenth Circuit, the Federal Aviation Act's lack of
an express preemption clause governing general air safety affects the
issue of federal preemption in three significant ways. First, it affects
the interpretation of the Act's savings clause. 25' While the effect of a
savings clause will be restrictively interpreted "if it is superseded by a
more specific substantive provision, such as a preemption clause,"2 52
the clause will otherwise be viewed as leaving existing state common
law or statutory remedies intact.253 Because the Federal Aviation Act
only contains an express preemption provision that "relat[es] to rates,
243 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
291 (1993). For an account of the facts of this case, see supra notes 56-58 and accompany-
ing text.
244 Id. at 1441 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 253 (1984)).
245 Id. at 1444 (stating that "Congress has intended to allow state common law to stand
side by side with the system of federal regulations it has developed").
246 Id. at 1444 n.17.
247 Id. at 1441.
248 Id. Piper argued that the regulations promulgated under the Federal Aviation Act
impliedly preempt state products liability actions by comprehensively governing the field
of airplane safety. Id.
249 Id. at 1442 (summarizing the district court's ruling).
250 Id. at 1443-44.
251 Id. at 1443; see supra part IA2 for the text of, and a discussion regarding, the Fed-
eral Aviation Act's savings clause.
252 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1443 n.11 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112S.




routes, or services of any air carrier,"254 and not to tort claims such as
those brought by Cleveland, the court viewed the Act's savings clause
as evidence of the Act's nonpreemptive effect on state tort actions. 255
Second, the Tenth Circuit also viewed the Act's lack of a preemp-
tion provision governing general air safety in conjunction with the
Act's express but limited preemption clause to deny Piper the defense
of implied preemption.2 56 The court cited Cipollone for the rule that
implied preemption is generally not applicable to "a federal statute
that contains an express preemption provision."257 Although the Fed-
eral Aviation Act governs two broad areas of congressional concern,
the Act's express preemption clause governs only one of these areas-
the rates and routes of commercial air carriers. According to the rule
announced by the Supreme Court in Cipollone, this implies that the
Act does not have preemptive effect on the other broad area of con-
gressional concern-general air safety.258 Cleveland's claims of defec-
tive design, in other words, were neither expressly nor impliedly
preempted by the design safety regulations promulgated under the
Federal Aviation Act.
Finally, the Federal Aviation Act's lack of an express preemption
clause governing general air safety affects the interpretation of the
"minimum" standards designation given to the Act's safety regula-
tions. 259 The district court determined that by designating federal air
safety regulations as minimum standards, "Congress indicated that it
did not want to bar states from adopting additional or more stringent
standards."260 On appeal, Piper attempted to counter this determina-
tion by directing the court's attention to a line of cases holding that
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA) 261 and
its corresponding regulations "preempt state tort claims for failure to
install air bags."262 In response, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that
254 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988).
255 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1443-44.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1443. The implication behind such a preemption clause is that when en-
acted, Congress had the opportunity to fix the scope of such a clause. Therefore, any
action that later falls beyond the preemptive reach of such a clause is, by definition, not
preempted. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992).
258 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1444 (citing Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618).
259 Id. at 1445.
260 Id. (summarizing the district court's ruling).
261 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
262 Cleveland; 985 F.2d at 1446 (citing Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787
(10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865
F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990)).
The federal safety regulations at issue in these cases can be found in 49 C.F.R.
§ 571.208 (1994) (Standard No. 208). Deciphering them, however, is a different prospect
altogether. According to the Tenth Circuit-although it is not at all determinable from a
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while there are key similarities between the NTMVSA and the Federal
Aviation Act, "there are also key differences." 263
The NTMVSA, like the Federal Aviation Act, authorizes a regula-
tory agency of the federal government to issue minimum safety stan-
dards with respect to the design of a product.264 Unlike the Federal
Aviation Act, however, the NTMVSA contains an express preemption
clause governing motor vehicle safety standards. 265 This provision for-
bids any state-established safety standard "which is not identical to the
Federal standard."266 By preempting those state laws requiring a stan-
dard of performance different from the federal standard, the
NTMVSA's express preemption clause bestows upon the NTMVSA's
minimum standards a meaning different from that of the minimum
standards of the Federal Aviation Act. As a result, the Tenth Circuit
held that the Federal Aviation Act's lack of an express preemption
clause governing general air safety prohibited Piper from asserting a




A. Tort Reform is an Inefficient Solution to the General
Aviation Crisis
1. The Main Case Against Tort Reform
Perhaps the biggest opponent to tort reform for the general avia-
tion industry is the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA). Un-
like general aviation manufacturers, ATLA attributes the industry's
cursory glance at the regulations themselves-Standard No. 208 gives automobile manu-
facturers "a choice of equipping cars with any of three types of passenger restraints," one of
which includes air bags. Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1446. The cases cited above held, in gen-
eral, that "'a state common law rule that would, in effect, remove the element of choice
authorized in Safety Standard 208 would frustrate the federal regulatory scheme.'" Id.
(quoting Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827). In other words, if a jury found an auto manufacturer
liable for a crash victim's injuries because the manufacturer failed to install airbags in the
automobile in question, it would establish a state safety standard that conflicted with the
federal standard. Id. (citing Kitts, 875 F.2d at 789).
For an expanded analysis suggesting an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act based
on the express preemption clause found in the NTMVSA, see infra part ll.B.1.
263 See Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1447.
264 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (1988)).
265 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988).
266 Id.
267 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1447. The court reached this decision despite Piper's re-
peated assertions that it had complied with the federal air safety regulations as they existed
at the time of the plane's production-the plane's "tailwheel" design was approved by the
FAA, and the FAA seat belt requirements in place when the agency approved the design of
the plane did not require shoulder harnesses. Id. at 1445.
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decline to factors other than products liability lawsuits.2 68 Not surpris-
ingly, the organization is opposed to revamping the nation's tort sys-
tem on behalf of the general aviation industry.2 69 Targeted members
of Congress allegedly received $2.5 million in campaign contributions
last year from ATLA, along with subtle requests to keep tort reform off
their agendas.2 70 In a 1989 statement before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, ATLA's message was loud
and clear: "The primary incentive to build safe airplanes which meet
today's technology is coming from the civil liability system." 271 Appar-
ently someone was listening-nearly ten months later, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary recommended that Senator Kassebaum's
Senate Bill 640 not pass.2 72 Shortly thereafter, the General Aviation
Accident Liability Standards Act failed to become law for the third
consecutive session of Congress.273
In support of its position concerning the incentives provided by
the civil liability system, ATLA emphasizes that the minimum stan-
dards of the Federal Aviation Act are "antiquated," often based on
technology from the World War II era.2 74 Furthermore, ATLA points
to section 1355 of the Act, which authorizes the Secretary of Transpor-
tation to delegate examination and inspection responsibilities to
"properly qualified" private individuals.2 75 According to ATLA, such
"self regulation," combined with the use of outdated standards, coun-
sel against the enactment of a "relaxed liability standard" that tort re-
form legislation would create.2 76
ATLA also insists that supply and demand have had a tremendous
impact on the general aviation industry. As evidence of a shrinking
demand for small aircraft, Charles T. Hvass, Jr., a spokesman for
ATLA, points to the decline in student starts over the past several
years.2 77 In 1978, when the industry was at its peak, the FAA issued
268 Charles T. Hvass, Jr., Testimony before the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures Concerning General Aviation Liability 6-11 (December 12, 1991) (transcript available
from ATLA) [hereinafter Hvass].
269 Id. at 1.
270 Hoffer, supra note 145, at 3277. Of these "donations," most were of the maximum
allowable amount, with 95% going to Democrats. Id.
271 Charles T. Hvass, Jr., Statement of the Association. of Trial Lawyers of America
Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation on S. 640 "Gen-
eral Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act of 1989" 3 (June 21, 1989) (transcript avail-
able from ATLA) [hereinafter ATLA Statement).
272 S. REP. No. 303, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990).
273 Id. The provisions S. 640, introduced by Kansas Senator Nancy Kassebaum, were
essentially identical to those contained in Senate Bill 67. See supra part I.C.2.
274 ATLA Statement, supra note 271, at 3.
275 Id. at 2-3 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1355 (1988)).
276 Id. at 2.
277 Hvass, supra note 268, at 10.
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over 200,000 new student certificates.278 In 1988, issuance of new stu-
dent certificates fell to a low of 125,000.279 Hvassjuxtaposes this fall
in demand with a corresponding increase in supply. In 1974, general
aviation pilots in the United States were supported by a base of about
100,000 aircraft. 280 By 1981, according to Hvass, "over 115,000 addi-
tional new aircraft were manufactured and added to [this] fleet."28'
Thus, as Hvass concludes, the general aviation industry matched a de-
clining population of American pilots with a fleet of aircraft that
nearly doubled in size over a seven-year period. 282 Even a cursory ap-
plication of basic economic principles to such opposing trends sug-
gests a troubled industry.
2. Criticisms of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994
According to the president of the American Bonanza Society,
(which publishes a magazine for Beech aircraft owners), the general
aviation tort reform legislation introduced to the 103d Congress rep-
resents "a reasonable attempt to strike a better balance between the
parties of a general aviation liability suit" 2 3 Similar talk of "striking a
balance" was heard in Congress when Representative Synar of
Oklahoma, like many other congressional supporters of the statute of
repose, announced that Congress "must strike a balance between the
manufacturers as well as the consumers," and that "[s] uch a balance
was struck with [the 1994 Act]."284 Careful examination of the 1994
Act, however, suggests that "two wrongs don't make a right." While
the views espoused by GAMA portray an industry beset by products
liability lawsuits, shifting the law unreasonably in favor of manufactur-
ers does not achieve a "reasonable balance." In fact, as this Note illus-
trates, the 1994 Act is not only detrimental to legitimate products
liability claimants, but it simultaneously fails to provide the general
aviation industry with sufficient relief from illegitimate products liabil-
ity lawsuits.
The statute of repose mandated by the 1994 Act exemplifies the
tremendous bias that general aviation tort reform legislation creates
in favor of manufacturers. As a result of this bias, many general avia-
tion accident victims will be unable to recover damages from manufac-
turers whose aircraft were legitimately defective. Numbers alone
illustrate the law's prejudicial impact. The 1994 Act exempts general
278 Id.; see also id. attached chart (detailing decline in total pilots and new student cer-
tificates from 1974 to 1989).
279 Id. at 10 & attached chart.
280 Id. at 10.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Hoffher, supra note 145, at 3277.
284 140 CONe. REc. H5004 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of Rep. Synar).
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aviation aircraft manufacturers from any future civil liability with re-
spect to over sixty-two percent of the general aviation aircraft in use in
the United States today.285 In other words, over half of the small
plane pilots (and their passengers) in this country are now unable to
recover damages from an aircraft manufacturer in the event of a crash
or other injury, even if the cause of the accident is due to a legitimate
defect in the aircraft's design, manufacture, or marketing.
Apart from the sheer number of aircraft affected, however, the
inherent bias of the 1994 Act is best illustrated by the justification for
the statute of repose. According to House Report 525 (I), "[i] t is ex-
tremely unlikely that there will be a valid basis for a suit against the
manufacturer of an aircraft that is more than 18 years old. Nearly all
defects are discovered during the early years of an aircraft's life."2 86 It is be-
cause of this 'Justification" that the various proponents of the legisla-
tion were able to claim that it was fair to both consumers and
manufacturers. 28 7 This justification, however, is based on a misguided
presumption regarding products liability law-that all product defects
will surely surface within the first eighteen years of an aircraft's life.
Although this presumption may be true for manufacturing defects, it
is by no means accurate where design defects are concerned.
Professors Henderson and Twerski make this point when discuss-
ing the interconnectedness of design and manufacturing defects:
When a product fails during normal use in the early part of its life
span, the reason for the failure can almost always be attributed to a
manufacturing defect. Responsible manufacturers do not design
their products to fail so close to the starting line.288
With twenty-five years representing the average age of general aviation
aircraft in this country,289 and forty or fifty years often representing
the useful life of such aircraft, 290 the eighteen-year statute of repose
contained in the 1994 Act may be said to cover only "the early part" of
an aircraft's life span. If this is true, the misguided presumption upon
which the 1994 Act is based will leave many legitimate design defect
claimants without legal recourse.
285 Telephone Interview with Shelley Snyder, Manager of Communications, General
Aviation Manufacturers Association (Nov. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Snyder].
286 H.. REP. No. 525(I), supra note 6, at 3, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. at 1640
(emphasis added).
287 Id.
288 HENDERSON & TWrKtsI, supra note 74, at 564 (emphasis added).
289 Estimates of average age vary depending on the source. See, e.g., 140 CONG. Ruc.
H4999 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of Rep. Fish) ("[A]bout 120,000 Cessnas are
still in operation and their average age is 27 years."); 139 CONG. REc. S195 (daily ed. Jan.
21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum) (estimating average age of "over 22 years");
GAMA, supra note 2, at 1 ("The average single engine aircraft in the U.S. is 28 years old.").
290 H.R. REP. No. 525(I), supra note 6, at 2, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1639.
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The facts of Mickle v. BlackMon, 291 a products liability case decided
by the South Carolina Supreme Court in 1969, demonstrate that
although the passage of time may preclude a jury from reasonably
finding that a product contained a manufacturing defect, it does not
necessarily preclude a reasonable finding that the same product con-
tained a design defect.292 Janet Miclde was injured in an automobile
accident when she was impaled by a gearshift lever which entered her
body behind her left armpit, damaged her spinal cord, and caused
permanent paralysis. 293 She sued the Ford Motor Company, alleging
that the manufacturer was negligent in its design of the gearshift lever
and the white knob affixed to the end of it.2 4
The gearshift lever on the 1949 Ford in which Janet Mickle was
injured was mounted on the right side of the steering shaft.295 With-
out an adequate protective knob mounted on its end, the thin steel
lever could easily pierce the body of a passenger who might be thrown
against it.26 Thus, Ford fitted the end of these levers with plastic
knobs, available in assorted colors. 297 In its 1949 models, Ford used a
white knob.298 In 1950, the company switched to black knobs.299 Af-
ter exposure to sunlight for an undetermined length of time, the
white knobs would deteriorate and develop hairline cracks; Ford was
aware of this tendency.300 These cracks "destroyed the force distribut-
291 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969).
292 This case also illustrates that statutes of repose like the one mandated by the 1994
Act completely ignore the doctrine of crashworthiness, which focuses on the capacity of a
vehicle to protect its occupants from additional or enhanced injuries during a survivable
accident. If a general aviation aircraft makes it to the age of 18, it is probably safe to
assume that it has never been involved in an accident. It is also safe to assume, therefore,
that the design of such an aircraft, with respect to its crashworthiness, has never been
questioned. (One may dispute this conclusion by positing that a large number of aircraft
sharing the same design features is bound to produce a crash in which the integrity of the
model's crashworthiness is tested. For the purposes of this analysis, however, the author
assumes that no two crashes are alike, and that different aspects of an aircraft's
crashworthiness are involved in every such accident.) This would not be a problem for
general aviation aircraft pilots and passengers in the past: if they were subsequently injured
due to a design defect that minimized the crashworthiness of an aircraft, they could bring a
legitimate products liability action against its manufacturer. With the passage of the 1994
Act, however, a crash that comes 18 years and one day after an aircraft was first purchased
may mean the difference between damage compensation and arbitrary injustice. Sud-
denly, within a period of 24 hours, the legitimate design defect that caused injury to the
occupants of the plane becomes legally nonexistent.
293 Mick/e 166 S.E.2d at 178.
294 Id. at 179. Although ajury originally rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the
trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
the plaintiff appealed. Id.




299 Id. at 188.
300 Id.
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ing quality" of the white knobs and caused them to "shatter easily on
impact."301 After developing such cracks, a white knob was of no
value as a protective guard, although it remained useful as a hand-
hold.30 2 Janet Mickle claimed this defect caused her injury.
Among its many arguments, Ford urged that the judgment in its
favor should be affirmed because the gearshift lever and knob were
not defective when they left the manufacturer, and Ford could not
reasonably be held liable, after thirteen years, for injuries caused by
the deterioration of the knob.303 The appellate court noted that thir-
teen years was a considerable length of time for a manufacturer to
remain responsible for the design of its product.3 04 Nevertheless, the
court found that ajury could reasonably infer that the age of the knob
was merely coincidental with its failure, and that the knob would have
shattered similarly had the accident occurred earlier in the life of the
car.3 05
In reversing the lower court and entering judgment for the plain-
tiff, the appellate court issued what is perhaps the opinion's most en-
during language: "The important inquiry is not how long the knob lasted
but what caused its failure. Mere passage of time should not excuse
Ford if its negligence was the cause."306 This language illustrates that
the passage of time does not affect all potential products liability
claims equally. The passage of time seems to have supported the man-
ufacturer's position that no manufacturing defect existed; however,
the passage of time did not preclude a reasonable finding that the
product contained a design defect.
If an analogy is made between the facts of Mickle and those of a
typical general aviation accident, it becomes evident that the justifica-
tion cited by proponents of the 1994 Act for the fairness of a general
aviation statute of repose is based on a misguided presumption re-
garding products liability law. The passage of time does not, as sup-
porters of the legislation insist, affect all products liability actions
equally. Despite what Congressman Synar may believe, the 1994 Act
did not strike a balance between manufacturers and consumers of
general aviation aircraft. Instead, by mandating a uniform eighteen-
year statute of repose, the 1994 Act will prevent many general aviation
accident victims from recovering damages from manufacturers whose
aircraft are defectively designed.
301 Id.
302 Id. The black 1950 knobs never developed such cracks because the agent used to
produce their black color, carbon, was highly resistant to ultraviolet rays. I&
303 Id. at 188-89.
304 Id. at 190.
305 Id.
306 Id. (emphasis added).
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The statute of repose contained in the 1994 Act not only leaves
many legitimate products liability claimants without legal recourse,
but also fails to provide the general aviation industry with a realistic
"cure" for its crisis. The statute's extremely narrow focus, limited to
general aviation aircraft and component parts over eighteen years
old,30 7 will, in all likelihood, prevent it from adequately protecting
general aviation manufacturers from illegitimate products liability law-
suits. If, as GAMA argues, large products liability judgments and liti-
gation defense costs are the cause of the industry's decline,308 then
what is going to protect manufacturers from the 80,000 to 100,000
general aviation aircraft that are too young to be affected by the stat-
ute of repose? Furthermore, if and when manufacturers like Cessna
begin manufacturing thousands of new aircraft each year, what will
protect manufacturers against the eighteen years of liability attached
to each new aircraft? Finally, how will the industry respond when state
courts and juries look beyond the "deep pocket" aircraft manufac-
turer and find the "deep pocket" engine manufacturer, or other com-
ponent part manufacturer, whose products are found on virtually
every general aviation aircraft old enough to be affected by the 1994
Act? With a rolling statute of repose that applies to new replacement
parts, sympathetic juries will still have a scapegoat. Cases such as Dat-
skow 39-where despite NTSB findings of no defect, the jury awarded
the largest products liability judgment in the history of general avia-
tion against the manufacturer of the aircraft's rebuilt engine-will
continue unabated.
Because Congress chose tort reform (as opposed to regulatory
reform as this Note proposes) as the means by which to provide relief
to the general aviation industry, the narrow focus of the 1994 Act will
create a need for broader tort reform legislation. As one source em-
phasized at the Washington D.C.-based Legislative Action branch of
the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, the recent statute of re-
pose is "not a panacea."310 Other supporters of general aviation air-
craft manufacturers share such feelings and nervously await future
battles over broader legislation. After passage of the 1994 Act, GAMA
admitted that while it supports broader tort reform legislation, the
narrower measure "was all we could get."311 Congressional opposition
to broader tort reform legislation may be dwindling, however, as the
Republicans take control of both houses of Congress for the first time
307 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
308 See GAMA, supra note 2, at 4.
309 826 F. Supp. 677 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). For discussion of Datkow, see supra notes 63-67
and accompanying text.
310 Telephone Interview with AOPA Legislative Action representative who wished to
remain anonymous (Nov. 10, 1994).
311 Snyder, supra note 285.
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in forty years.3 12 With fewer opponents in Congress and a "construc-
tively" revitalized industry realizing its need for further protection,
broader tort reform legislation like Senator Kassebaum's ill-fated Sen-
ate Bill 67 may soon be introduced into Congress as the "second step"
necessary to save the general aviation industry.313
3. Criticisms of Senate Bill 67
General aviation manufacturers and their congressional allies will
soon likely be supporting broader tort reform legislation. Extensive
revisions to substantive law, such as those proposed by Senate Bill 67,
will likely become the focus of their campaign. Such revisions, how-
ever, would provide general aviation manufacturers with an even
greater advantage over legitimate products liability claimants than the
1994 Act. With respect to actions seeking damages for harm caused
by a defective aircraft or component part, the proposed legislation
would establish a uniform federal standard of liability. This standard
would supersede the law of each of the fifty states and would essen-
tially create a separate chapter of products liability law applicable only
to lawsuits involving general aviation accidents.3 14 Unlike the eight-
een-year statute of repose, this "special" products liability law would
apply uniformly to all general aviation accident lawsuits, whether in-
volving a thirty year-old Cessna 182, or a Beech Starship fresh from its
manufacturer.
Based on yet another misguided assumption regarding products
liability law, the justification put forth in support of Senate Bill 67
illustrates how ill-suited the bill is to deal with the crisis it seeks to
remedy. Like the statute of repose, Senate Bill 67 ignores the primary
question of whether or not an aircraft was in fact defective in its de-
sign, and instead focuses on curtailing products liability lawsuits, re-
gardless of whether plaintiffs' claims are legitimate or not. According
to the drafters of Senate Bill 67, "the increase in the number of liabil-
ity claims and the size of awards and settlements, and the excessive
time and expense devoted to the resolution of such claims, impose a
substantial economic burden on general aviation manufacturers and
their dealers."31 5 This statement may very well be true. However, as
the drafters of the new Restatement of Products Liability emphasize in
the comments to Tentative Draft 1, the negative effect liability may
have on an industry's economic health does not provide an adequate
justification for rewriting products liability law unreasonably in favor
312 See Horak, supra note 146 (indicating that "[m]ostly Democrats opposed Senate Bill
67 in the past").
313 See Lewis, supra note 191, at 1.
314 S. 67, supra note 162, § 4.
315 Id. § 2(5).
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of manufacturers. Rather, standards of liability should be based on
"whether a product is reasonably designed."316
Another shortcoming of Senate Bill 67 is the failure of its primary
liability standard to distinguish between manufacturing and design de-
fects. Section 5(b) (1) of Senator Kassebaum's bill would allow a per-
son to recover against a manufacturer if "the product, when it left the
control of the manufacturer, was in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous for its intended purpose, according to engineering and
manufacturing practices which were reasonably feasible."317 The itali-
cized phrase is taken verbatim from section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.31 8 Tentative Draft 1 of the new Restatement, how-
ever, acknowledges that section 402A was originally drafted to deal
316 TENTATIvE DRAFr 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. d. Whether a product is reasonably
designed depends on whether it measures up to predetermined design standards. See, e.g.,
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983) ("Implicit in the term 'defect' is a
comparison of the product with a standard of evaluation; something can be defective only
if it fails to measure up to that standard."). If the product meets such standards, a plaintiff
should be precluded from bringing a lawsuit-this is the effect federal preemption would
have on the federal air regulations. If, on the other hand, a manufacturer did not meet
the required design standards, or represented that it did when in reality it did not, then an
accident victim should be allowed to proceed with his or her action. In the first instance,
the general aviation industry will be protected from the damaging effects of illegitimate
products liability lawsuits. These are, after all, the types of lawsuits the industry complains
about. In the second case, an injured plaintiff will be able to recover from a manufacturer
whose product was legitimately defective. This is the type of situation ATLA argues must be
preserved. The essential point of this Note is that only if Congress introduces federal pre-
emption into the products liability system as it applies to the general aviation industry will
the system be truly "balanced" with respect to manufacturers and consumers. Without the
implementation of such a system, the extensive framework of federal design standards will
never be utilized in the manner it was intended-or updated if found to be lacking. With-
out such a system, the risks of flying will never be spread equitably between those who
manufacture the aircraft and those who fly them.
317 S. 67, supranote 162, § 5(b) (1) (emphasis added). The full text of§ 5(b) (1) reads
as follows:
(b) Actions Against General Aviation Manufacturers.-
(1) Defective Condition.-Any person claiming damages for harm aris-
ing out of a general aviation accident may bring an action against a general
aviation manufacturer of a product and may recover damages from such
general aviation manufacturer if-
(A) the product, when it left the control of the manufacturer, was in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended purpose, ac-
cording to engineering and manufacturing practices which were reasonably
feasible;
(B) the defective condition is a proximate cause of the claimant's
harm; and
(C) the general aviation aircraft was being used at the time of the acci-
dent for a purpose and in a manner for which it was designed and
manufactured.
Id.
318 See RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 77, § 402A(1).
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only with manufacturing defects3 19 If Senate Bill 67 were passed, it
would thrust upon each state an outdated standard of liability which
fails to take into account that "the rule developed for manufacturing
defects is inappropriate for the resolution of claims of defective
design."3 20
More significant, however, than the bill's misguided justification
or its failure to recognize the distinction between manufacturing and
design defects, is the overwhelming bias it would provide to manufac-
turers in lawsuits involving general aviation accidents. The nature and
extent of such bias would depend on whether the plaintiff's claim was
based on a manufacturing defect, or a defect in the product's design.
With respect to manufacturing defects, pro-manufacturer prejudice
would occur simply as a result of the bill's appropriation of the out-
dated language of section 402A. In Cronin v. JB.E. Olson Corp.,32' the
California Supreme Court rejected section 402A's requirement that a
product defect must be "unreasonably dangerous" to the consumer in
order to invoke strict liability.3 22 Concerned that the requirement
"rings of negligence,"3 23 the court held that the showing of a defect
that proximately caused injury is sufficient to justify application of
strict liability.3 24 While the draft of the new Restatement does not fol-
low Cronin with respect to liability for products that are defectively
designed or sold without adequate warnings or instructions,325 it does
follow Cronin with respect to claims for manufacturing defects. 32 6
319 TENTATIVE DRA r 1, supra note 1, § 1 cmt. a; see also Henderson & Twerski, supra
note 80, at 1526 & n.7 (citing WsLwAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96
(3d ed. 1964)).
320 TENTATVE DRAFr 1, supra note 1, § 1 cmt. a.
321 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
322 Id. at 1163.
323 Id. at 1162.
324 Id. at 1163.
325 Although § 2 of Tentative Draft 1 slightly alters the 402A language "in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous," it retains the "ring of negligence" the Cronin court
attempted to avoid. For example, § 2(b) of the new draft outlines the liability standard for
design defects and provides that a product is defective in design if the omission of a reason-
able alternative design rendered the product "not reasonably safe." TENTATIVE DRAFr 1,
supra note 1, § 2(b).
326 The Cronin court applied its formulation to "the full range of products liability
situations, including those involving design defects." 501 P.2d at 1162. According to the
court, a distinction between manufacturing and design defects was "not tenable." Id. at
1163. Tentative Draft 1, however, reaches exactly the opposite conclusion: "In general the
rationale offered for imposing strict liability for harm caused by manufacturing defects do
not apply in the context of imposing liability for defective design and defects based on
inadequate instruction or warning." TENTATIVE DRArr 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a. As a
result of such reasoning, Tentative Draft l's liability standard for manufacturing defects is
devoid of any language that might be interpreted by a court to require an application of
negligence principles: "A product contains a manufacturing defect when the product de-
parts from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the prepara-
tion and marketing of the product." Id. § 2(a).
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Under the direction of Tentative Draft 1, a plaintiff bringing a
manufacturing defect claim merely "bears the burden of establishing
that such a defect existed in the product when it left the hands of the
manufacturer."3 27 Unlike the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
draft of the new Restatement does not require a plaintiff to prove that
a defectively manufactured product is "unreasonably dangerous." By
retaining such language, therefore, Senate Bill 67 could subject a
plaintiff seeking recovery for a manufacturing defect to a "bifurcated
standard" of proof3 28 Such a standard-having to convince the
finder of fact that "the product is, first, defective and, second, unrea-
sonably dangerous"-is, by definition, more difficult for plaintiffs to
meet than the unitary standard contained in Tentative Draft 1.329
Senate Bill 67 would thus provide manufacturers with an unfair advan-
tage over plaintiffs bringing manufacturing defect claims.
The proposed liability standard in Senate Bill 67 would also give
manufacturers an unfair advantage over products liability claimants
bringing actions for defective design. This advantage would come not
as a result of borrowing language directly from section 402A, but
rather from adding to such language outdated products liability doc-
trine. For example, by inserting the caveat "according to engineering
and manufacturing practices which were reasonably feasible,"330 Sena-
tor Kassebaum introduced into the bill's uniform standards of liability
a requirement that some commentators refer to as "state of the art"33 1
An "overwhelming majority" of the jurisdictions that have
adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts admit
state-of-the-art evidence in design defect cases.33 2 Some states admit
such evidence as a measure of consumer expectations.333 Other states
327 TENTATIVE DRAFr 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. b.
328 Cronin, 501 P.2d at 1162.
329 Id.
330 S. 67, supra note 162, § 5(b)(1).
331 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 8, at 909. For a general discussion of state-of-the-art evi-
dence in products liability cases, see Gary C. Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the
Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1982). According to Robb,
state of the art is meant to define the level of scientific knowledge and technological exper-
tise associated with a given product at the time of the design and manufacture of the
product. Id. at 5. Robb is also of the opinion that state of the art should not to be con-
fused with the customs of an industry, which may at any given time lag behind the techno-
logical development associated with a product. Id. at 4-5. But see Jerry J. Phillips, The
Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. GIN. L REV. 101, 115 n.71
(1977) ("State of the art refers to customary practice in the industry .... ").
332 HEPNDERSON & TwEtsia, supra note 74, at 620. State-of-the-art evidence is never
relevant in lawsuits alleging manufacturing defects because state-of-the-art technology has
no bearing on the issue of whether a product measures up to its manufacturer's own stan-
dards of production. See Robb, supra note 331, at 10-11.
333 SeeRobb, supra note 331, at 11 (citing Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442,
447 (10th Cir. 1976)). In Bruce, 32 of the 40 passengers aboard a Martin 404 were killed
when, after a successful crash landing, seats which had broken loose from the floor
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admit state-of-the-art evidence as part of a risk-utility test.3 34 Several
states have even enacted statutes that provide for state-of-the-art de-
fenses.33 5 The salient point, however, is that "'state-of-the-art' has
been variously defined by a multitude of courts."3 36 Some courts de-
fine "state of the art" as industry custom or practice.33 7 Other courts
define the phrase as the most advanced technology available that has
been generally adopted for a particular use.3 38 Professors Henderson
and Twerski probably view the phrase as a buzzword, a doctrinal term
that impedes a rational analysis of the underlying issues.33 9
Regardless of whether the phrase "state of the art" is employed, a
manufacturer being sued for selling a defectively designed product
would prefer that evidence suggesting the feasibility of a suggested
design alternative be measured against industry custom or practice. 340
As Judge Learned Hand stated in the famous case, The T.J. Hooper341
[A] whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. [The industry] never may set its own tests,
blocked the exit and prevented escape from the ensuing fire. 544 F.2d at 444. The Tenth
Circuit upheld summaryjudgement in favor of the manufacturer. Id. at 448. Of principle
weight in the court's decision was the fact that the plaintiffs did not show that an "ordinary
consumer would expect a plane made in 1952 to have the safety features of one made in
1970." Id. at 447. State-of-the-art evidence was essential to the determination of what an
ordinary consumer would expect. Id. See supra note 109 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the rejection by Tentative Draft 1 of the use of a consumer expectations test
as an independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs. The draft
encourages courts to adopt a risk-utility balancing approach in which consumer expecta-
tions are one factor, among many, to be considered. See TENTATvE DitaFr 1, supra note 1,
§ 2 cmt. e.
334 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (holding there was no error in admitting state-of-the-art evidence to show the feasi-
bility and cost of alternative designs).
335 HENDERSON & TwERsKI, supra note 74, at 621; Robb, supra note 331, at 11-12. Stat-
utes cited by both sources include: ARiz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (West 1992) (listing
state of the art as an affirmative defense to defendants accused of inadequate design or
fabrication); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Baldwin 1994) (rebuttable presumption
that a product is not defective if its "design, methods of manufacture, and testing" con-
formed to the "state of the art").
336 TENTATivE DRAFr 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. c(3) reporters' note.
337 See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Ala. 1979) ("Generally speak-
ing, 'state of the art' refers to customary practice in the industry.").
338 See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 298 (N.H. 1983) ("It has
long been recognized that because entire industries may lag behind in the development of
safer and technologically feasible alternatives, 'custom and usage' is an unsound standard
of liability.").
339 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 80, at 1546.
340 Recall that according to Tentative Draft 1, "a product is defective in design if the
omission of a reasonable alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe." TEN-
TATIVE DRA-r 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. d. A plaintiff is not required to produce a "proto-
type" of a reasonable alternative design in order to make out a prima facie case. Qualified
expert testimony will suffice "if it reasonably supports the conclusion that a reasonable
alternative design could have been adopted at the time of sale." Id cmt. c.
341 60 F.2d 737 (1932).
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however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is
required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disre-
gard will not excuse their omission.542
The design standards employed by the manufacturers of any given in-
dustry, therefore, may routinely be lower than those technologically
feasible. .Allowing an industry to set its own standards as to whether a
suggested alternative design is reasonably feasible may thus be ex-
tremely biased against plaintiffs in design defect cases.
By requiring that the defectiveness of the product in question be
measured "according to engineering and manufacturing practices
which were reasonably feasible,"348 Senate Bill 67 could work to hold
general aviation manufacturers to a lower standard of liability in prod-
ucts liability actions. The language certainly suggests the lower stan-
dard of "industry custom or practice" when compared to the language
of other products liability statutes defining state-of-the-art: "state of
scientific and technological knowledge available to the manufacturer
... at the time the product was placed on the market."34
Senate Bill 67 also appears to reserve for manufacturers a lower
standard when compared to the language of Tentative Draft 1: "'State
of the art' refers to the safest technology developed and in commer-
cial use at a given time."345 When discussing the difficulty a plaintiff
may have in proving that a manufacturer could have adopted a rea-
sonable alternative design, Tentative Draft 1 declares that "compli-
ance with state of the art does not preclude a finding that a safer
alternative was practically feasible."346 Such a standard presents a con-
siderably less biased alternative than Senate Bill 67's so called state-of-
the-art standard, which one commentator argues would provide gen-
eral aviation manufacturers with an absolute defense in products lia-
bility lawsuits.347
The language in Senate Bill 67 would bestow upon manufacturers
yet another unfair advantage over products liability claimants bringing
actions for defective design. The third element of Senate Bill 67's
primary liability standard requires a plaintiff to prove that "the gen-
eral aviation aircraft was being used at the time of the accident for a
purpose and in a manner for which it was designed and manufac-
342 Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
343 S. 67, supra note 162, § 5(b)(1)(A).
344 ARK. CoDE ANN. § 16-116-104(a)(1) (Michie 1987).
345 TENTATivE DRAFr 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. c.
346 Id. Recall that under Tentative Draft l's proposed risk-utility balancing test, con-
formity of a product design to state of the art technology is one factor that a court will take
into account when considering whether a manufacturer should have adopted a suggested
alternative design. Id. See supra note 109 for a nonexhaustive list of factors that may be
considered when determining whether an alternative design is reasonable and whether its
omission rendered a product "not reasonably safe."
347 See Wells, supra note 8, at 909.
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tured."348 By inserting this additional caveat into the language bor-
rowed from section 402A, Senator Kassebaum introduced into the
bill's primary standard of liability a requirement known as "intended
use."
4 9
In order to be fair, most courts will not hold a manufacturer lia-
ble for injuries a consumer suffered as a result of using a product in
an unforeseeable or unreasonable manner.350 For example, the man-
ufacturer of an aircraft is not liable for the destruction of the aircraft
when such destruction resulted from the pilot's failure to do a pre-
flight check of the aircraft and his attempt to take off with the air-
craft's gust locks still in place.351 The same reasoning would apply to
prevent the user of a knife from suing its manufacturer because the
user employed the knife as a toothpick and was subsequently
injured.35 2
In order to adopt a reasonable product design, however, manu-
facturers must foresee and guard against a certain amount of foresee-
able, albeit foolish, behavior on the part of consumers.353 For
example, in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 354 a manufacturer claimed
that it had no duty to design a car to be safer in the event of a colli-
sion, especially when such a collision was the fault of the driver.3 5 5
The Eighth Circuit disagreed. The court reasoned that whether or
not it is the fault of the driver, a collision is foreseeable from the point
of view of an automobile manufacturer.3 5 6 As a result, the court ex-
plicitly rejected the narrow intended use rule urged by the manufac-
turer-that an automobile crash is foreseeable, but definitely not
intended.3 57
Much like auto accidents, general aviation accidents are foresee-
able, and even inevitable, from a manufacturer's point of view. 358 But
348 S. 67, supra note 162, § 5(b) (1) (C).
349 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 8, at 910-11. As was the case with the phrase "state of the
art," professors Henderson and Twerski would probably view "intended use" as a buzzword,
a doctrinal term that impedes a rational analysis of the underlying issues. See HENDERSON
& TwERsiu, supra note 74, at 669-70.
350 TENATAvE DRAmr 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. 1(1) reporters' note.
351 Kroon v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1223, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1979). Gust
locks are used when a plane is tied down in order to stabilize the plane's aileron and
elevator. Id.; see also Kay v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 1370, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that decedent's failure to realize that rear engine had ceased prior to take-off,
despite warnings in pre-flight checklist, was not a reasonably foreseeable harm from the
manufacturer's standpoint).
352 See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977).
353 HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 74, at 669.
354 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
355 Id. at 496.
356 Id. at 502.
357 Id. at 501-02.
358 See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
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as the Larsen court determined nearly thirty years ago, manufacturers
should not be allowed to escape liability for a defectively designed
product by asserting that they did not intend for it to be involved in
an accident. The intended use language of Senate Bill 67, however,
could allow general aviation manufacturers to do just that. 59 Not
only would such a result be unfair to defective design plaintiffs, but it
would be in direct opposition to the mandate of section 2(b) of Tenta-
tive Draft 1, which provides that manufacturers are liable for "foresee-
able risks of harm" that could have been reduced by the use of a
reasonable alternative design.360 Senate Bill 67, in other words, could
reserve for manufacturers a narrower standard of liability than that
required by general products liability law.
4. Finding an Efficient Solution to the General Aviation Crisis
Congressional consideration and adoption of tort reform legisla-
tion on behalf of the general aviation industry has, at the very least,
clarified the two distinct interests involved in the general aviation cri-
sis. ATLA wants to preserve products liability as a means of ensuring
safety in the general aviation industry.36' Its main complaint is that
defectively designed planes are getting off the ground, crashing, and
often killing the passengers within them. As plaintiffs' attorneys,
members of ATLA want to make sure that clients who are injured be-
cause of a defectively designed plane have a means of being compen-
sated. Ostensibly, ATLA represents the interests of public health and
safety.362
GAMA, on the other hand, is possessed with the singular desire of
saving the general aviation industry. As is evident from the federal
legislation it has sponsored over the past eight years, manufacturers of
general aviation aircraft believe that tort reform is the only solution to
their industry's problems. GAMA's main complaint is that federal air
safety regulations and state tort law are leading manufacturers in dif-
ferent directions, ultimately leaving them without security and vulner-
359 In other words, aircraft crashes, under the proposed standard, could be viewed as
producing harm that was not intended, rather than harm that was clearly foreseeable.
360 TENTATIVE DRAFr 1, supra note 1, § 2(b). The new draft of the restatement pro-
vides that liability will not attach in a defective design action unless "the seller or a prede-
cessor in the chain of distribution knew or should have known of the risks of harm or the
risk avoidance measures." Id. cmt. i.
361 The author is well aware that as trial lawyers, members of ATIA arguably have
other, less altruistic motivations behind lobbying against tort reform legislation-namely,
their pocketbooks. As an attorney-to-be, however, the author respectfully leaves such argu-
ments for those more inclined to "lawyer-bashing."
362 Because of ATLA's typical alignment with the injured party bringing suit, this analy-
sis will refer to its position as the consumer interest.
1995]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
able to products liability lawsuits. GAMA and its members represent
the interests of economic and industrial health. 363
Each of these substantial and competing interests have compel-
ling arguments as to why the U.S. general aviation industry has degen-
erated to its present state. The purpose of this Note is not to suggest
which of these causal arguments is correct, but rather to propose an
efficient solution that addresses both the consumer interest and the
manufacturer interest. Essential to this purpose is the fact that these
two competing interests share a common objective. Oddly enough,
this common objective was emphasized by a plaintiffs' attorney shortly
after his client was awarded the largest products liability judgment in
aviation history. According to Arthur Alan Wolk, the plaintiff's attor-
ney in Datskow,36 "If you prevent the accident, there is no lawsuit, and
the product liability problem, as you call it, goes away."365 Preventing
accidents-not lawsuits-is the one objective shared by both sides of
the general aviation crisis. It is the one objective which, if met, would
ostensibly satisfy both the consumer interest and the manufacturer
interest.
Laws can do little to prevent accidents caused by pilot error.3 66
Laws can, however, have a marked effect on preventing accidents
caused by defectively designed aircraft.36 7 It is ironic, therefore, that
neither the 1994 Act nor Senate Bill 67 will prevent small airplanes
from crashing as a result of defects in their design. Regardless of the
1994 Act's new statute of repose, every potentially fatal, but as yet un-
detected, design defect on any general aviation aircraft in the United
States will still be there tomorrow. In fact, each such fatal defect will
remain on its respective aircraft until it causes the aircraft, along with
363 Because of GAMA's typical alignment with the defendant in a general aviation law-
suit, this analysis will refer to its position as the manufacturer interest.
364 826 F. Supp. 677 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
365 Wolk, supra note 62, at 119.
366 Regulations concerning the training and certification of pilots may, if strictly en-
forced, drastically reduce the incidence of such accidents. This is a separate issue indeed
worthy of independent exploration. The fact that, according to the NTSB, design and
manufacturing defects are the cause of only 1% of all general aviation accidents, has been
largely ignored by courts andjuries. See H.R. REP. No. 525(I), supra note 6, at 3, reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.CAN. at 1640. Accidents of this nature-or perhaps more accurately, allegedly
of this nature-are the focus of this Note.
367 If aircraft manufacturers have predetermined federal design standards to follow,
and such standards have preemptive effect over nonidentical state standards, compliance
with such standards will greatly reduce (if not eliminate) the occurrence of accidents
caused by design defects. If determinations of compliance are given the weight of law, as
this Note suggests, injured plaintiffs and the families of individuals killed in general avia-
tion accidents will not be able to sue the aircraft's manufacturer for defectively designing
the plane if the manufacturer complied with federal design standards. While insurance
might provide compensation for such individuals, no longer will they be able to gamble
that a sympathetic jury might find a defect in the plane's design.
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its pilot and passengers, to go down.3 68 When this happens, the survi-
vors and families of those killed in certain aircraft accidents will be
able to obtain compensation from those responsible for the defect
that caused the accident. Many others, however, will be left without
legal recourse. Such arbitrary treatment will not result from anything
the pilots or passengers did, or, for that matter, anything the manufac-
turer did. The reason for such arbitrary treatment, as someone will
inevitably have to explain to those who are denied an opportunity to
recover damages, is simply the age of the aircraft involved. This is the
"balance" Congress struck when it passed the 1994 Act.3 69
In the real world, while a statute of repose or uniform federal
liability standards may curtail some illegitimate lawsuits, neither form
of legislation will solve the problem regarding which design safety
standards manufacturers should follow. As a result, neither form of
legislation will provide general aviation aircraft manufacturers with in-
centives to build safer airplanes. Why should a manufacturer spend
time and money to meet every federal design standard when compli-
ance with such standards is often ignored by juries?370 By simply
shielding manufacturers from liability, such legislation fails to address
the one common objective both sides of the general aviation crisis
support-the prevention of accidents. This critical shortcoming ren-
ders both the 1994 Act and Senate Bill 67 inefficient as means of solv-
ing the general aviation crisis.
B. A Proposed Solution: Regulatory Reform
1. First Step: Amending the Federal Aviation Act to Include an
Express Preemption Clause
Although general aviation is one of the most heavily regulated
industries in the United States, neither its manufacturers nor its con-
sumers currently receive the potential benefits afforded by federal
regulation. The Cleveland and Datskow cases illustrate that it is often
impossible to reconcile jury verdicts with the regulations promulgated
by the FAA and the findings of other federal agencies such as the
368 The author uses the term "fatal" to distinguish between design defects which by
themselves have the potential of causing accidents, such as an inadequately designed fuel
line, and design defects which will not, in and of themselves, cause an aircraft to crash,
such as inadequately designed seats or seatbelts. The latter type of design defect may ex-
pose a manufacturer to liability for "increased harm" to a pilot or passenger involved in an
accident. In contrast to "fatal" design defects, however, incidence of such harm is depen-
dant upon a non-defect-related crash (i.e., an accident resulting from pilot error). See, e.g.,
TENTATIVE DRAFr 1, supra note 1, § 6 (titled "Defect-Related Increases in Harm").
369 See supra text accompanying notes 283-84.
'370 See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Or. 1978) (stating that
compliance with statutory or administrative safety standards is not conclusive on the ques-
tion of tort liability).
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NTSB. One commentator, who is convinced that juries often ignore
"scientific reality" when arriving at verdicts in general aviation law-
suits, explains the predicament created by such an inconsistent regula-
tory environment as follows:
[General aviation aircraft manufacturers] invest enormous sums in
an effort to design and manufacture new and better products and to
comply with the directives, regulations, and objectives of the execu-
tive branch of government, only to be told, after the fact, by lawyers
and judges, and occasionally by juries, that despite best efforts and
faithful compliance, their products were poorly designed and dan-
gerous and their behavior so inappropriate that punitive damages,
in the millions of dollars, can be awarded against them.3 7 1
With the executive branch mandating one standard and the judicial
branch creating numerous others, it is not surprising that the general
aviation industry is on the verge of collapse. What is surprising is that
juries are allowed to flagrantly disregard the extensive regulatory
scheme mandated by Congress.
Greater certainty as to which safety standards general aviation
manufacturers are required to follow would obviously benefit the in-
dustry as a whole. Manufacturers would be able to concentrate on
meeting one set of design standards and feel confident that their
good faith compliance with such standards meant that their aircraft,
by definition, did not contain design defects that would later come
back to haunt them. Greater certainty with respect to design stan-
dards would also ultimately benefit the consumers of general aviation
aircraft. Not only would exclusive use of the federal safety standards
require federal agencies to bring those standards up-to-date, but it
would also ensure that every aircraft consumer in the country benefits
from technological improvements that facilitate increased safety
standards.372
Assuming that FAA scientists, engineers, and test pilots are better
qualified than juries to determine whether the design of a particular
aircraft is safe, it seems reasonable to allow their word to govern when
the design of an aircraft is questioned. Amending the Federal Avia-
tion Act to include an express preemption clause governing general
air safety would achieve such a result. The Supreme Court's opinion
in Cipollone is instructive in this regard because it illustrates the meth-
371 Martin, supra note 3, at 490.
372 Under the current system, a higher design standard applied in California courts
will not help a consumer who is injured in an aircraft crash in New York. The existence
and enforcement of different standards in each of the 50 states not only induces forum
shopping but also keeps higher standards in one state from (a) influencing manufacturers
in another state to change their designs, and (b) benefiting plaintiffs who happen to crash
their aircraft in different jurisdictions mandating lower standards of safety.
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odology a modem court would use when deciding an issue of federal
preemption.373
In Cleveland, the Cipollone methodology was applied to the Federal
Aviation Act. Although most general aviation manufacturers might
look at Cleveland negatively-i.e., as an example of why a particular
defense will not immunize them from liability-the decision should
be viewed as a beacon of hope-i.e., as a roadmap of how manufactur-
ers could use their compliance with the Federal Aviation Act's safety
standards to immunize them from products liability lawsuits.
As discussed in Part I.D.3. of this Note, the Cleveland court re-
viewed a line of cases holding that the NTMVSA 374 and its correspond-
ing regulations preempt products liability actions alleging that a
manufacturer defectively designed an automobile because it failed to
equip the automobile with an airbag.3 75 Shortly after distinguishing
the cases, the court emphasized the differences between the Federal
Aviation Act and the NTMVSA:
[W]hile there are, without question, similarities between the
NTMVSA and the Federal Aviation Act, there are also key differ-
ences. Like the Act in question here, the NTMVSA contains a sav-
ings clause preserving state tort remedies. Similarly, the NTMVSA
authorizes the regulatory agency to issue only minimum standards.
However, unlike the Federal Aviation Act, the NTMVSA contains an express
preemption provision governing safety. This provision forbids any state-es-
tablished "safety standard... which is not identical to the Federal stan-
dard.". . . In this case, however, the Federal Aviation Act contains no
express preemption provision governing safety.376
Inadvertently, however, by distinguishing the NTMVSA from the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, the Cleveland court described the one tool general
aviation manufacturers might be able to use to immunize themselves
from products liability lawsuits-namely, an express preemption pro-
vision governing safety like that found in the NTMVSA. 377
373 For an overview of the Court's holding in CipoUone and a description of the meth-
odology it employed to resolve an issue of federal preemption, see supra part I.D.2.
374 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
375 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1446 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 291 (1993).
376 Id. at 1447 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
377 The NTMVSA's preemption clause reads:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this
subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have
any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any
motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard ap-
plicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equip-
ment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section
shall be construed as preventing any State from enforcing any safety stan-
dard which is identical to a Federal safety standard. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government
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The type of preemption scheme included by Congress in the
NTMVSA permits a state to regulate any aspect of the product not
regulated by the federal government. A state may not, however, cre-
ate a nonidentical standard which would apply to any aspect of the
product actually regulated by the federal government.378 In this man-
ner, "Congress has balanced the public safety interest, protected by
[the federal] standards, with the needs of a nationwide manufacturing
industry for predictability and uniformity of safety requirements for
[the] manufacture and design of its products."3 79 Unlike the general
aviation tort reform legislation, this preemption provision allowed
Congress to satisfy the interests of both automobile manufacturers
and automobile consumers.
While worded somewhat differently, the Federal Aviation Act's
preemption clause governing rates and routes of commercial air carri-
ers was enacted to achieve the same goals of uniformity and predict-
ability.3 8 0 Specifically, section 1305 (a) (1) was intended to "prevent
conflicts and inconsistent regulations."3 1 The House of Representa-
tives observed that in the absence of such a provision, federal and
state authorities had required passengers traveling between two cities
to pay different fares depending on whether they were flying inter-
state or intrastate.382
Today, Congress has found similar problems with the system for
determining liability for individuals injured in general aviation
accidents:
[A]lthough the incidence of injuries to passengers in general avia-
tion accidents has decreased, the number of general aviation acci-
dent liability claims against general aviation aircraft manufacturers
and the amount of damages sought in such claims is increasing at
of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety re-
quirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment pro-
cured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of
performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable
Federal standard.
15 U.S.CA. § 1392(d) (1988).
378 Timothy Wilton & Richard P. Campbell, Effect of Federal Safety Regulations on
Crashworthiness Litigation, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 554, 561 (1987).
379 Id. at 561.
380 The full text of section 1305(a) (1) of the Federal Aviation Act reads:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State or political
subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of
two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, stan-
dard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates,
routes, or services of any air carrier having authority under subchapter IV
of this chapter to provide air transportation.
49 U.S.C app. § 1305 (a) (1) (1988).
381 H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N.
3737, 3752.
382 Id. at 15-16, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. at 3751-52.
800 [Vol. 80:747
NOTE-FEDERAL PREEMPTION
disproportionate rates, beyond any relationship to the quality of the
aircraft manufactured and in use.385
Amending the Federal Aviation Act to include an express preemption
clause governing the area of general air safety would, as similar ac-
tions did for the automotive and commercial airline industries, relieve
both general aviation manufacturers and their consumers of the bur-
dens caused by inconsistent federal and state regulation.
Borrowing language from both section 1305 (a) (1) of the Federal
Aviation Act and section 1392(d) of the NTMVSA, the following is an
example of an amendment that could be made to the Federal Avia-
tion Act to bestow preemptive effect upon the federal air safety stan-
dards promulgated under the authority of the Act:
Whenever a safety regulation of civil aeronautics, as established
under subchapter VI of this Act, is in effect, no State or political
subdivision thereof, no interstate agency or other political agency of
two or more States, and no State or Federal court shall have any
authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to
any civil aircraft or item of civil aircraft appliance, any safety stan-
dard, law, court decree, common law, rule, regulation, or other pro-
vision having the force of law applicable to the same aspect of
performance of such aircraft or item of appliance which is not iden-
tical to the Federal standard.
This type of express preemption clause would provide the "first step,"
in a two-step process, toward balancing the interests involved in the
general aviation crisis. The effect of this first step would be to change
the level of significance courts would require juries give to a manufac-
turer's compliance with the Federal Aviation Act's design safety
standards.
2. Effect of a Preemption Clause on the Act's Minimum Standards
Congress originally designated the FARs promulgated under the
Federal Aviation Act as minimum standards. Congress apparently
made this designation because it "did not want to bar states from
adopting additional or more stringent standards." s8 4 Cases such as
Cleveland and Datskow, along with the conflicts and inconsistencies
they have created, prove that this is indeed what the states have
done.as5 While congressional intent to create minimum standards, as
opposed to uniform standards, has been directed at other industries,
seldom has it spawned such drastic economic consequences.3
8 6
585 S. 67, supra note 162, § 2(a)(2).
384 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1445 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 291 (1993).
385 For a discussion of the Cleveland and Datskow cases, see supra part Ia.3.
386 See Wilton & Campbell, supra note 378, at 561 n.38 (citing Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1985) (holding that in light of the federal
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Because congressional intent is the touchstone of federal pre-
emption, an express preemption clause governing general air safety
would change the interpretation of the "minimum" designation given
to the federal air safety regulations. 387 Like the intent behind Con-
gress' enactment of section 1305(a) (1) of the Federal Aviation Act
and section 1392(d) of the NTMVSA, the congressional purpose in
enacting an express preemption clause such as the one proposed in
this Note would be to establish uniform requirements for the general
aviation industry and to prohibit juries from holding manufacturers
accountable to divergent standards.388
As a result of a new congressional mandate, states would no
longer have the option to adopt additional or more stringent general
aviation design standards. Instead, the FARs' minimum standards
designation would be interpreted as allowing manufacturers to exceed
the standards if they desired to do so.3 8 9 An example might be an
aircraft manufacturer who, like the automobile manufacturer, Volvo,
boasts of building planes safer than those of its competitors. En-
hancement of safety standards by juries, on the other hand, would be
precluded.
3. Effect of a Preemption Clause on the Act's Savings Clause
Adopting an express preemption clause such as the one proposed
in this Note would also change courts' interpretation of the Federal
Aviation Act's savings clause. As one commentator has asserted,
"l[t] he Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that savings clauses
may not be applied literally so as to permit any state common law
remedies, even those which conflict with the federal scheme."390 In-
stead, savings clauses should be read in conjunction with the rest of
interest to ensure compliance with minimum standards, county ordinances regulating the
donation of blood plasma were not preempted by less stringent federal regulations under
§ 351 of the Public Health and Service Act); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 144-53 (1963) (holding that, without an irreconcilable conflict between fed-
eral minimum standards and state standards or a congressional mandate of preemption, a
California statute which gauged the maturity of avocados was not preempted by less strin-
gent federal marketing orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture)).
387 Id. at 561-62.
388 Id.
389 Id. at 562. See also Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1445. The United States, which filed an
amicus brief urging preemption in Cleveland, attempted to make this argument. The court,
however, rejected it. See id.
390 Wilton & Campbell, supra note 378, at 565. According to Wilton and Campbell, the
Supreme Court has refused to indulge in literal applications of savings clauses since as
early as 1907. Id. at 565 n.61 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S.
426, 446 (1907) (holding that despite its savings clause, the Interstate Commerce Act pre-
empted a state common law claim that conflicted with the federal regulatory scheme)).
The Supreme Court revisited its holding in Abilene Cotton Oil 74 years later, and again
rejected a plaintiffis argument that a state law cause of action could be brought against a
shipper for behavior already approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. at 566
[Vol. 80:747
NOTE-FEDERAL PREEMPTION
the legislation. Often, for example, such legislation will contain a pre-
emption clause that indicates Congress' intent to regulate an area to
the exclusion of the states. The only state common law actions that
should be allowed to survive preemption under such circumstances
are those that do not conflict with the objectives of the federal regula-
tory scheme.391
The generally accepted rule on the interpretation of savings
clauses was perhaps best stated in International Paper v. Ouelette,392
where the Supreme Court reasoned that it did "not believe Congress
intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a general
savings clause."3 93 The Supreme Court quoted this language in
Morales when it examined the Federal Aviation Act's Savings Clause.
394
In the context of a challenge to state laws prohibiting deceptive adver-
tising of air fares, the Court held that despite the Act's savings clause,
the preemption provision of section 1305(a) (1) expressly preempted
state truth-in-advertising laws.3 95 In other words, the Court limited
the effect of the Federal Aviation Act's savings clause because it was
superseded-in the area of rates and routes-by an express preemp-
tion clause. 396
If the amendment proposed in this Note was enacted, the savings
clause of the Federal Aviation Act would have to be read in conjunc-
tion with the express preemption provision governing general air
safety.397 Products liability actions would be preempted only when
they were premised on nonidentical state standards directed at the
"same aspect of performance" as the federal air safety regulations.
With the addition of the proposed preemption clause, therefore,
states would still be free to regulate any aspect of general aircraft
safety that is not covered by a federal standard.398 If no federal stan-
dard governed the strength of a propeller blade, for instance, states
would be free to establish and enforce their own legal standards,
through common law or statute, on that point.399 The preemption
clause, however, would prohibit a jury from finding a manufacturer
n.61 (citing Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick &Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318,331-32
(1981)).
391 Id. at 565-66.
392 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987) (holding that the Clean Water Act preempts state com-
mon law to the extent such law attempts to impose liability on a point source in another
state).
393 Id. at 494.
394 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2037 (1992).
395 Id.
396 Id.
397 See Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 n.2 (D. Haw.
1990) (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to the preemption and savings clauses of
the NTMVSA).




liable for failing to comply with any standard contrary to an applicable
federal standard.
4. Second Step: Modernizing Federal Air Safety Regulations
As suggested above, amending the Federal Aviation Act to in-
clude an express preemption provision governing general air safety
would only constitute the first step of an efficient solution to the gen-
eral aviation crisis. While federal preemption would immunize manu-
facturers from lawsuits alleging defective design, consumers of general
aviation aircraft would not, by these measures alone, also benefit. A
second step would, therefore, have to be taken to balance the interests
involved in the general aviation crisis.
Criticisms of the federal regulatory scheme governing general avi-
ation, raised by ATLA and others, provide a touchstone for the second
step of an efficient solution to the general aviation crisis-the mod-
ernization of federal air safety regulations. The first of the two most
frequent criticisms of the federal regulatory scheme focuses on the
substance of the existing FARs that govern the design of general avia-
tion aircraft. Three arguments are commonly raised in opposition to
the use of federal air safety regulations as standards of liability: first,
the regulations are unsatisfactory because they are out of date; sec-
ond, the regulations are vague; and third, the regulations establish
only minimum standards. 400
As outlined above, the enactment of an express preemption
clause governing general air safety would enable the federal air safety
regulations to become more than simply minimum standards. The
standards would, with the addition of the proposed amendment, be
interpreted as uniform standards. Despite this change, however, air-
craft safety would not necessarily be enhanced without addressing the
two remaining arguments against using the federal regulations as stan-
dards of liability.
If it is true that current federal air safety regulations are out-of-
date and vague,40' they will fail to provide courts with adequate gui-
dance when complex aircraft liability issues arise. This was the case in
Cleveland. Piper asserted that Cleveland's claims that the aircraft was
designed with inadequate forward vision from the rear seat contra-
vened the FAA's approval of the aircraft's tailwheel design.40 2 How-
ever, as the Tenth Circuit was quick to point out, federal regulations
400 Lindvall, supra note 109, at 398-99.
401 This unsatisfactory condition is to be expected of standards which everyone but the
manufacturers themselves are allowed to disregard. Under the current system, the only
standards that need to be up-to-date are those used in the courts, promulgated either by
state statute or state common law.
402 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1445 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 291 (1993).
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do not require the precise design Piper utilized.40 3 Rather, section
23.773(a) (1) of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that pilot
compartments must be "[airranged with sufficiently extensive, clear
and undistorted view to enable the pilot to safely taxi, takeoff, ap-
proach, land, and perform any maneuvers within the operating limita-
tions of the airplane."40 4 It is no wonder that the court agreed with
Cleveland that Piper could have improved the plane's forward visibil-
ity without conflicting with the pertinent federal design standard.40 5
An alternative adjudicative body comprised of representatives of
existing governmental agencies and aircraft manufacturers may be
able to provide courts with better guidance in complex aircraft litiga-
tion cases.40 6 The panel could include representatives from the Fed-
eral Aviation Agency, the National Transportation Safety Board, and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.40 7 These repre-
sentatives could work with aircraft manufacturers to promulgate com-
pulsory uniform aircraft safety standards. In theory, such a panel
would do a better job than the FAA of promulgating standards that
are not only precise and easy to understand, but also more representa-
tive of modern technology.40 8
The main advantage of such a panel would be the allocation of
authority across several agencies. This would help to prevent political
favoritism toward aircraft manufacturers, an allegation often aimed at
the FAA.409 It is also likely that if federal standards were used as a
measure of liability in the adjudication of every general aviation prod-
ucts liability lawsuit in the country, democratic forces would facilitate
more stringent and modern standards.410 Regardless of their origin,
403 Id.
404 14 C.F.R. § 23.773(a) (1) (1994). See also Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1445 (discussing
imprecision of this standard).
405 985 F.2d at 1445.
406 Lindvall, supra note 109, at 404-05. Lindvall suggests that this alternative "adjudica-
tive" body could also determine the reasonableness of manufacturers' designs when
crashworthiness disputes arise. Id. The author disagrees with this portion of Lindvall's
proposal. Once regulatory reform measures have been taken, there should be no reason
why judicial bodies across the country could not competently adjudicate aircraft accident
lawsuits themselves. See also Bruce Landsberg, Frontal Assault: A Case Study of a Typical Acci-
dent Lawsuit; AOPA PILOT, Mar. 1995, at 85 (proposing a nongovernmental oversight board
of aeronautical personnel including pilots, engineers, maintenance technicians, air traffic
control experts, and possibly attorneys to review the legitimacy of general aviation accident
investigations).
407 Lindvall, supra note 109, at 404-05.
408 Id.
409 With the fervor and color one would expect from a good plaintiffs' attorney, Ar-
thur Alan Wolk asserts the following about the FAA- "The bottom line is the FAA is an
incompetent agency of government, in bed with the manufacturers it is supposed to regu-
late and out to lunch when it comes to reliability." Wolk, supra note 62, at 119.
410 For example, instead of spending millions of dollars lobbying their congressional
representatives to sponsor unpopular and inefficient tort reform legislation, groups such
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new federal air safety regulations should be "up-to-date, clear, and
precise."411 They should also be flexible enough to allow manufactur-
ers to produce aircraft notwithstanding unanticipated design
problems. 412
The second of the two most frequent criticisms of the federal reg-
ulatory scheme focuses on the procedure through which the existing
federal air safety regulations governing general aviation are enforced.
Section 1355(a) of the Federal Aviation Act authorizes the Secretary
of Transportation to delegate inspection and certification responsibili-
ties to "properly qualified" private individuals. 413 This provision cre-
ates a significant amount of self-regulation by the general aviation
industry; an aircraft is certified when the results of tests performed by
its manufacturer are submitted to the FAA. ATLA argues that the exis-
tence of such a loose federal regulatory structure does not justify re-
placing civil liability as the main incentive for manufacturers to build
safer aircraft. 414
If the amendment proposed in this Note was enacted, states
would retain primary responsibility for setting general aviation design
standards until such time as the corresponding federal standards were
brought up to date. 415 Any program designed to revamp the FARs
would take time. Therefore, until all safety-oriented FARs were certi-
fied as up-to-date, states would be allowed to "plug the holes" in the
federal regulations with either statutory or common law standards.
Even after the modernization of the FARs was completed, general
aviation manufacturers could still be held liable for certain causes of
action as a result of the savings clause of the Federal Aviation Act.
While FARs would be exclusive when they applied, they would never
be exhaustive. In Cipollone, for example, the Court found that the pre-
emptive scope of the Cigarette Act's express preemption clause did
not extend to all common law claims. 416 If this Note's proposed
amendment was enacted, a general aviation plaintiff would not be pre-
vented from alleging that an accident resulted from a manufacturing
as GAMA would spend their time working with federal authorities to improve specific
FARs. Consumer groups, such as AOPA, would do the same. This time would be more
constructively spent because it would be directed at the standards that the manufacturers
would actually be judged against-not at a proposed piece of tort reform legislation that
only promised to stop a percentage of the future products liability lawsuits brought against
the industry's manufacturers.
411 Lindvall, supra note 109, at 405.
412 Id.
413 49 U.S.C. app. § 1355(a) (1988).
414 ATIA Statement, supra note 271, at 2.
415 This procedure would provide manufacturers with an incentive to assist in the pro-
cess of bringing the federal standards up to date. Without a diligent effort on their part,
manufacturers would be forced to wait longer for the preemptive protection the proposal
in this Note would establish.
416 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2621 (1992).
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defect, or from a manufacturer's failure to adequately instruct or warn
of foreseeable risks of harm associated with the use of its aircraft.417
In addition, a general aviation plaintiff could still sue a manufacturer
for negligence in its testing or research practices, or for breach of an
express warranty.418
According to Cipollone, general aviation plaintiffs would also have
available to them a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion.419 This would be especially significant if a plaintiff suspected
that a manufacturer had either concealed from or failed to disclose to
the FAA important material facts concerning the design certification
of the aircraft in question. Furthermore, general aviation plaintiffs
could recover in tort if they could prove that a "manufacturer was
negligent or breached the implied warranty of merchantability by fail-
ing to comply with [a] federal standard."420 By preserving these po-
tential claims for plaintiffs, regulatory reform offers consumers a built-
in policing system that would ensure manufacturer compliance with
federally mandated safety standards.
5. Regulatory Reform is an Efficient Solution to the General Aviation
Crisis
As a solution to the general aviation crisis, regulatory reform,
such as the express preemption clause proposed in this Note, would
provide manufacturers with greater protection from illegitimate prod-
ucts liability lawsuits. Because it is not based on the age of an aircraft,
regulatory reform, unlike tort reform, would exempt general aviation
manufacturers from all illegitimate design defect lawsuits-not just
claims involving aircraft that are over eighteen years old. In fact, un-
like tort reform, regulatory reform would exempt general aviation
manufacturers who complied with all pertinent federal design stan-
dards from any and all claims of design defect. For example, a plain-
tiff unable to reach an aircraft manufacturer because of the statute of
repose would not instead be able to go after a replacement part manu-
facturer and hope for a sympathetic jury or a lucrative settlement.
As a solution to the general aviation crisis, regulatory reform is
also a better alternative from a consumer's point of view. First, mod-
ernized federal air safety regulations will allow manufacturers to con-
centrate on one set of design standards instead of many. The safety
standards will be higher, and thus will produce safer and more relia-
417 See id. at 2621-22 -(holding that Cigarette Act did not preempt all failure to warn
claims).
418 See id. at 2622-23 (holding that Cigarette Act did not preempt claims for breach of
express warranty).
419 Id. at 2623-24.
420 Wilton & Campbell, supra note 378, at 566.
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ble aircraft. The process will also put aircraft accident victims on a
level playing field across the country. No longer will the state in which
an aircraft crashes play such a large role in determining whether or
not its occupants are able to recover from a responsible manufacturer.
Furthermore, injured parties will not be denied recovery merely be-
cause an aircraft was a month, a week, or a day too old.
Section two of Senator Kassebaum's Senate Bill 67 announces as
one of Congress' findings that "the Federal Government has an inter-
est in the general aviation accident liability system because the Federal
Government has established a comprehensive system for regulating
general aviation."421 This declaration provides an ironic backdrop for
proposing regulatory reform as an efficient, legal solution to the gen-
eral aviation crisis. Unlike tort reform legislation-which promises to
supplant an established and "comprehensive" system of regulation
with a prophylactic federal tort system-regulatory reform would util-
ize the existing comprehensive regulatory system to achieve its goals.
In other words, regulatory reform would "fix" the current system of
federal law, as opposed to needlessly creating additional legislation to
stack on top of existing federal regulations.
An efficient solution to the general aviation crisis, therefore, is
one that balances the interests of both consumers and manufacturers
of general aviation aircraft. If products liability lawsuits are truly the
cause of the demise of America's general aviation industry, an effi-
cient solution is not achieved by stacking the liability deck unevenly in
favor of manufacturers. By first bestowing preemptive effect upon a
manufacturer's compliance with a federal air safety regulation, and by
next bringing the current standards up-to-date and ensuring manufac-
turer compliance by preserving for plaintiffs alternative causes of ac-
tion, the regulatory reform this Note proposes represents an efficient
solution to the general aviation crisis.
CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, the American general aviation industry has
dissolved to a mere shadow of its former, robust self. Not only has
yearly production of general aviation aircraft fallen by more than
17,000 aircraft per year, but thousands of industry employees have lost
their jobs. Paralleling this economic downturn has been a marked
increase in the number of products liability lawsuits brought against
general aviation manufacturers. These manufacturers have claimed a
causal connection between the two phenomena. Because they believe
that juries have indiscriminately held them to safety standards higher
than those required under federal law, general aviation aircraft manu-
421 S. 67, supra note 162, § 2(6).
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facturers have supported tort reform legislation intended to hamper
consumers' ability to bring such lawsuits.
By focusing solely on the economic problems of the industry,
however, both the 1994 Act and Senate Bill 67 are unfairly biased in
favor of manufacturers. While this legislation promises to shield gen-
eral aviation aircraft manufacturers from illegitimate products liability
lawsuits, it will do little to prevent airplanes from crashing due to de-
fects in their design. As a result, the legislation fails to take into ac-
count the consumer interest. Furthermore, as emphasized in
Tentative Draft 1 of the Restatement (Third) of Products Liability, fac-
tors such as depressed industry earnings and widespread unemploy-
ment are not relevant to the determination of whether a product is
reasonably designed.4 2 It is for these reasons that tort reform is an
inefficient solution to the general aviation crisis.
An efficient solution to the general aviation crisis would balance
the interests of general aviation aircraft manufacturers with those of
the industry's consumers. By first bestowing preemptive effect upon a
manufacturer's compliance with a federal air safety regulation, and
then bringing the current standards up to date and ensuring manu-
facturer compliance by preserving for plaintiffs alternative causes of
action, the regulatory reform proposed in this Note provides an effi-
cient and fair solution to the general aviation crisis. Accidents due to
the defective design of an aircraft or one of its component parts would
be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, under the proposed solution.
Regulatory reform is also an efficient solution to the general avia-
tion crisis because it salvages the existing yet underutilized federal reg-
ulatory scheme rather than creating a prophylactic federal tort law to
apply as a quick fix. Tort reform legislation, such as the 1994 Act and
Senate Bill 67, unconditionally ignores the hundreds of thousands of
hours drafters spent on creating comprehensive federal air safety stan-
dards. If general aviation manufacturers had their way, this federal
regulatory scheme could indeed be forgotten forever, buried under
additional and unnecessary federal tort law. An express preemption
clause such as the one proposed in this Note would allow the un-
derutilized federal regulatory scheme to be salvaged.
In the end, no one really knows for sure why the American gen-
eral aviation industry has deteriorated, and the debate addressing
such an issue could continue indefinitely. The tort reform legislation
introduced to the 103d Congress falls prey to this debate and sides
with general aviation manufacturers. Because it presupposes that tort
liability is the culprit of the industry's demise, such legislation will do
nothing to prevent defective aircraft from crashing. The tort reform
422 TENTATivE DRAFr 1, supra note 1, § 2 cmL d.
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measures will, however, arbitrarily prevent certain parties from recov-
ering. Regulatory reform, on the other hand, avoids the causal de-
bate, and instead focuses on preventing aircraft from crashing in the
first place. Regulatory reform will not only shield manufacturers from
illegitimate products liability lawsuits, but it will also save lives-a re-
sult that is, oddly enough, amenable to both manufacturers and
consumers.
PatrickJ. Sheat
t The author wishes to thank his father, James M. Shea, for not only introducing him
to the topic addressed in this Note, but also for his much needed advice and consultation
regarding the various arguments put forth. Thanks Dadl Special thanks also to fellow U.C.
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Peter W. Martin, A.B.,J.D.,Jane M.G. Foster Professor of Law
JoAnne M. Miner, B.A.,J.D., Senior Lecturer (Clinical Studies) and Director of Cornell
Legal Aid Clinic
Hiroshi Oda, LL.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Fall 1994)
Aviva A. Orenstein, A.B., J.D., Visiting Associate Professor (Fall 1994)
Russell K. Osgood, B.A., J.D., Dean of the Law Faculty and Professor of Law
Larry I. Palmer, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law
JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, BA, MA, J.D., Ph.D, Assistant Professor of Law
Ernest F. Roberts, Jr., B.A., LL.B., Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law
Faust F. Rossi, A.B., LL.B., Samuel S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques
Bernard A. Rudden, BA, M.A., Ph.D., LL.D., DCL, Visiting Professor of Law (Fall 1994)
Sharon E. Rush, BA, J.D., Visiting Professor of Law
Wojciech Sadurski, LL.M., Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1995)
StewartJ. Schwab, BA, MA,J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law
Robert F. Seibel, A.B., J.D., Senior Lecturer (Clinical Studies)
Howard M. Shapiro, B.A.,J.D., Associate Professor of Law (on leave 1994-95)
Steven H. Shiffin, B.A., MA, J.D., Professor of Law
John A. Siliciano, B.A., M.PA,J.D., Professor of Law
GaryJ. Simson, BA, J.D., Professor of Law
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Barry Strom, B.S.,J.D. Senior Lecturer (Clinical Studies)
Robert S. Summers, B.S., LL.B., William G. McRoberts Research Professor in the Administration
of the Law
Winnie F. Taylor, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Michele Taruffo, B.C.L., Visiting Professor of Law (Fall 1994)
Fernando R. Teson,J.D., SJ.D., Visiting Professor of Law
Tibor Varady, J.D., LL.M., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1995)
David Wippman, B.A., MA., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
Charles W. Wolfram, A.B., LL.B., Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor of Law
Faculty Emeriti
Harry Bitner, A.B., B.S., L.S., J.D., Law Librarian and Professor of Law
W. David Curtiss, A.B., LLB., Professor of Law
W. Tucker Dean, A.B.,J.D., M.B.A., Professor of Law
W. Ray Forrester, A.B., J.D., LL.D., Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law
Jane L. Hammond, B.A., M.S. in L.S.,J.D., Edward Cornell Law Librarian and Professor of Law
Milton R. Konvitz, B.S., MA,J.D., Ph.D., Litt. D., D.C.L., L.H.D., LL.D., Professor, New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Robert S. Pasley, A.B., LL.B., Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law
Rudolf B. Schlesinger, LL.B., Dr. Jur., William Nelson Cromwell Professor of International and
Comparative Law
Gray Thoron, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law
Elected Members from Other Faculties
Calum Carmichael, Professor of Comparative Literature and Biblical Studies, College of Arts
and Sciences
James A. Gross, Professor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations
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